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Liberty without Equality: The
Property-Rights Connection in a
"Negative Citizenship" Regime
David Abraham
Why, in comparison with other liberal capitalist democracies, is the social welfare state so poorly anchored in American law and public discourse?
Surely American political and social history have contributed much to the
weakness of our "socialstate." But law, too, has played a significant material, as well as ideological, role and has provided the terrainfor much of our
social development. This essay explores the particular contribution of the
property-liberty nexus to the stunted development of positive liberty and social citizenship in the United States. It traces this connection from the natural
rights and bourgeois Founders through several key conjunctures in American
history, including Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the civil rights periods
and compares some of the results with developments in Germany and the
aspirations of American progressives.
The essay contends that left and right alike have operated within a
highly resilientand constrictingframework that has made progress in the area
of social citizenship both awkward andfragile. Although some possibilitiesfor
forward movement have always existed and still remain, the prospects for
positive-liberty social-state law are not abundant: The master's house is not
about to be taken down with his own tools.
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© 1996 American Bar Foundation.

0897,6546/962101-0001$01.00

1

2

LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY

I. INTRODUCTION: LOCKEAN AMERICA
If indeed the United States, like much of Europe, is witnessing civil
society's disenchantment with the state-and its construction of citizenship-it behooves us to assess how much and what kind of light there is on
the outside of the Fordist-welfarist-statist tunnel through which we have
traveled. This essay looks at certain central aspects of America's liberal legal
and sociocultural ideology, what it has been and is, and how it sticks, particularly in regard to the private property-liberty connection. Apart from historicist reasons, which are, of course, adequate, examination of this ideology
is important because it continues to "create the terrain on which [we] move,
acquire consciousness of [our] position, struggle, etc."'

The culturally homogenous, economically bureaucratized, and politically corporatized systems characteristic of both the failed "Jacobin" regimes
of eastern Europe and the Keynesian welfare-state systems of northern and
western Europe were never dominant in the United States. Sombart or no
Sombart, Hartz or no Hartz, America has been critically different. Even
when our "welfare state" and "melting pot culture" enjoyed greater popularity than they do today, they were ideologically less well-anchored than Europe's-something of which Europeans have always seemed to be aware.
Several Christmases ago, long before Silvio Berlusconi Americanized
Italy's politics seemingly overnight and before the French Socialists desiccated, a group of French socialist intellectuals and parliamentarians met to
examine the nature and extent of what they took to be the serious malaise
that had overtaken their country. According to the New York Times,2 one
group of Socialist deputies
attributed France's troubles to its "progressive Americanization," which
they described as growing individualism, the impoverishment of the
state, the omnipotence of television, untempered consumer spending
and the emerging power of lobbies.
As the French parliamentarians-very Hartzian-pointed out, by implication at least, America, even in its welfare state mode, is a society of
abundant individual freedoms but with little collective organization, political purpose, or moral compass. America seems a world of sovereign individuals (coupled now with "identitoidia") in which any search for the common
good of a "peuple" is undermined. This has much to do with America's
1. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from thePrison Notebooks 377 (London, 1971). The task
of examining our value system requires broad-and potentially fallible-generalizations.
These will be found here.

2. N.Y. Times, 23 Dec. 1990, at A8.
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diversity and with our negative, property-based conception of freedom-our

Bill of Rights liberties-and our relative lack of positive, citizenship-based
goals.
More generally, America has contradicted Aristotle's summary statement of the function of government: "As the state was formed to make life

possible so it exists to make life good." America has shown that nations,
including their constitutions and their laws, need not proclaim positive collective purposes. On the contrary, by limiting political authority and the

very scope of politics itself, the American system aims to allow maximum
opportunity for individual flourishing. The state does not exist here to make
life good: fairness rather than justice is the hallmark of our legal aspirations
and our cherished rights. 3 "The right" on behalf of "unencumbered individuals" rather than "the good" on behalf of "situated" citizens is the goal of our
public energies, and this goal has arguably--created a socially corrosive
individualism.
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Whether it ever did in classical Athens or Rousseau's Geneva, law in
the modem world does not make civil society. Most countries cannot, for
example, legislate forms of solidarity that community does not generate or
support. But law, being located at the intersection of civil society and state,
combines the persuasive norms of the former with the coercive power of the
latter. Laws, like any rules, can and do structure choice, decision making,
and purposes for both individuals and societies. And rules, including rules
about rights, rest on foundations, which ought not to be lightly disdained.

3. We Americans keep finding ways to rediscover and rearticulate this fairness principle.
The most recent major reinvention was Rawls's. In A Theory of Justice (1971), justice itself, as
one critic pointed out, "was defined in good Kantian fashion not by substantive results but by
proper process, independent of the outcomes." Institutions are thus just when, in assigning
basic rights, they make no arbitrary distinctions among persons. Rawls provided new "intellectual underpinnings for the fascination with process to the exclusion of results." Fred Siegel, "Is
Archie Bunker Fit to Rule?" 69 Telos 24-25 (1986). See also Michael Sandel, "The Procedural
Republic and the Unencumbered Self," 12 Political Theory 87 (1984).
For the classical Platonic and Aristotelian roots of these positions, see Judith Shklar,
"Giving Injustice Its Due," 98 Yale L.. 1135 (1989).
4. Sandel has stated this contrast between liberal and communitarian images of society
forcefully:
Recalling the arguments of Hegel against Kant, the communitarian critics of modem
liberalism question the claim for the priority of the right over the good, and the picture
of the freely choosing individual it embodies. Following Aristotle, they argue that we
cannot justify political arrangements without reference to common purposes and ends,
and that we cannot conceive our personhood without reference to our role as citizens
and as participants in a common life.
Michael Sandel, ed., "Introduction," Liberalism and Its Critics 5 (New York, 1984). Cf.
Michael Walzer, "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism," 18 PoliticalTheory 6 (1990).
As one recent observer has put it, we have created "a self that exists only for itself,
without regard to species, to justice, to equality, or to obligation." Benjamin Barber, Strong
Democracy: ParticipatoryPoliticsfor a New Age 71 (Berkeley, Cal., 1984).
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Daily experience reminds us that, when it comes to rights, we still very
much live in a Lockean world. 5 Throughout American history we have
borne a conception of liberty that is formal, negative, expressed in contract,
and dependent on possession of property, which may or (more often) may
not bear a connection to labor.6 In fact, "private property" was and remains
the fulcrum for our system of constitutional rights. It will be argued here
that, despite the changes wrought by post-Civil War, New Deal, and
1960s-1970s equal protection/fundamental rights jurisprudence, we in the
United States have yet to escape the liberty-property linkage. The result is
that American law and politics operate within narrower, less pliant limits
than do those of other capitalist democracies while our rights ideology retains its individualist and libertarian cast.
American law started from and remains strongly wedded to the right of
property, that is, the secure guarantee of property possessed independent of
legal intervention. Added to that, logically and historically, has been an
effective right for all to acquire property. The universalization of the right to
acquire and hold property, through contract making and otherwise, provides, of course, no assurance that individuals will succeed in such acquisition. Finally, and most feebly, American law has struggled with the notion
of positive rights equivalent somehow to property.
Since FederalistNo. 10, the first object of government has been to protect the inequalities manifested in and derived from property and its accumulation by individuals of diverse faculties. Property has not been
5. There are many competing Lockes. Among the most lucidly and fairly presented is
Alan Ryan's Property and PoliticalTheory 14-48 (Oxford, 1984). On the issue of liberal neutrality and toleration in particular, see Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory 148-81 (Chicago, 1989).
There are several significant issues in Locke (and other contractarians) that I will not
address here, among them the patriarchal and gender-specific aspects. Some are addressed in
Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, Cal., 1988); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public
Man, Private Woman 108-27 (Princeton, NJ., 1981); Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western
Political Thought 10-21 (Princeton, NJ., 1979). Property/labor, work/wages, social recognition/self-esteem, production/reproduction, independence/citizenship: these couplings were
and remain central to our theories, and they are gendered.
6. For a keen discussion of the enduring impact of Madisonian/Malthusian "property" as
a limit on majority power, see Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American
Constitutionalism(Chicago, 1990). Nedelsky argues, inter alia, that the mainline Madisonian
product ignored Gouverneur Morris's warnings from the "right" that democratic forms could
be subverted and manipulated by a rich minority (at 67-95, 141-54) as well as James Wilson's
urgings from the "left" that broader democratic political participation would build citizenship
competence and lessen the effects of material, especially property, inequality (at 96-163).
Locke and his contemporaries defined property as encompassing or subsuming life, liberty, and estate. Property is currently viewed as consisting of rights and interests, the former
absolute, the latter relative, to possess, use, manage, dispose of, and exclude others from
things, personal and real. Property, like political sovereignty, is a power compelling service
and obedience. See Morris Cohen, "Property and Sovereignty," 13 Cornell L.Q. 8 (1927).
Rights may be defined as interests whose satisfaction is secured by the corresponding
duties of other persons (or institutions), the fulfillment of said duties generally being guaranteed by state power. See Wesley Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning 23 (Cambridge, Mass., 1923).
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eclipsed by concepts such as "citizenship." The Lockean-Jeffersonian-Madisonian idea that liberty and the capacity to participate in public governance
alike require the possession of property clearly prevailed among the Founders and their successors. 7 To be sure, what they understood by "property"
could be expansive: more than "estate," it could include liberties and security, the very rights on whose basis property could be accumulated. Thus,
there is property in rights as well as a right to property.8
All this seems true-whatever one thinks of more democratic Federalists like James Wilson or the recent debates over and attempts to vindicate
and use "republicanism." 9 For all its intellectual brilliance, the triad of "republicanism, communitarianism, and civic virtue," urged over the past decade or two by devotees of the Supreme Court (and veteran Warren Court
clerks in particular), has been unable to displace the more prosaic but ultimately more persuasive and well-founded trope of "liberalism, individual
rights, and representative government."
Of course, nothing is static or uncontested, and the relevance of the
Founders (or of the 18th or 19th centuries altogether) to current conflicts is
sometimes opaque. Still, there are patterns and even structures-sometimes
weighty, sometimes just nightmares weighing upon us. Madison's structure
lives on in several ways: the institutions of judicial review, federalism, separation of powers, the Takings Clause, and the Contracts Clause (prohibiting
the states from impairing contract obligations, countenanced by some under
7. See Drew McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy
(Cambridge, Mass., 1989).
8. This subsumption of estate as only one of the liberties is characteristic of Madison's
1793 essay, "On Property," and runs counter to the larger interpretation offered by Nedelsky,
supra note 6. James Madison, "On Property," in Marvin Myers, ed., The Mind of the Founder:
Sources of the PoliticalThought of James Madison (Hanover, N.H., 1981).
9. FederalistNo. 10 is home to Madison's key statement that "the protection of different
and unequal faculties of acquiring property" is "the first object of government." In the event
that America became like Europe, populated by large majorities of poor/propertyless white
people, it would be necessary to have political rules that diluted, checked, filtered, dissolved,
curbed, or otherwise blocked the formation and articulation of (potential) majority will. As
Nedelsky shows, Madison did not get everything he wanted, and some of what he did get no
longer survives.
On the connection between property and labor, compare Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 11-12 (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), with Michael
Kammen, "The Rights of Property and the Property in Rights," in E. Paul & H. Dickman, eds.,
Liberty, Property and the Foundationsof the American Constitution 11-13 (Albany, N.Y., 1989),
and Lawrence Becker, PropertyRights 32-56 (Boston, 1977). Kammen'is particularly insistent
on the "visionary" and capacious quality of Madison's understanding of property.
Anything that I might say on the subject of "republicanism" is reported and better said in
Dan Rodgers, "Republicanism: the Career of a Concept," J. Am. Hist. 11 (June 1992), and
Isaac Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism 163 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1990). For the nonspecialist, the key republicanism texts were J. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine
Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, N.J., 1975); Gordon Wood,
Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1969); John Murrin, "The
Great Inversion, or Court vs. Country: A Comparison of the Revolutionary Settlements in
England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816)," in J. Pocock, ed., Three British Revolutions:
1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeton, NJ., 1980).
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the Articles) being at various times among the more important. The purposes of that structure, according to a critical early Court opinion, are "the
right of acquiring and possessing property and having it protected. ..."
The Hartzian perspective, which stresses the "hegemony"-as always,
to be understood as based on consent, force, and fraud together-of a powerful liberal consensus in American life, and which most often follows from
accepting Locke as our key philosopher, must be given its due.10 This surely
does not mean that we view American history either as happy consensus or
as immutable. But it does mean that, notwithstanding the findings of the
republicanism excursus and the real conflicts and obsessions of the Revolutionary period, America did early become a liberal republic, albeit with
many slaves and slaveholders (capitalist and feudal, liberal and antiliberal).11 In fact, the "radicalism" of the American Revolution, including
that of its republican component, issued in or became "the most crucial
'l2
event in the creation of capitalism.
The conflicts among the Founders described by Beard and the Beardians, though generally real, were slight by European standards. Likewise, the
moralism, hunger for authenticity, and political paranoia of the Revolutionary Americans and their early descendants was of low intensity compared
to, say, that of the French revolutionaries of two decades later (and occasionally of their descendants, not to mention Germans and others). 13 This
10. Louis Harm, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955). Hartz showed that
even extremist thinkers such as the anticapitalist slavery apologist George Fitzhugh and the
would-be socialist Edward Bellamy were at their core liberals, unable to escape what Gad
Horowitz has called the "illusion of the ontological primacy of the individual."
The early Court interpretation of Madison's structure was Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 310 (1795).
11. On the relationship of this ideology to the propertyless and the enslaved, see David
Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution 1770-1823 at 257-62 (Ithaca,
N.Y., 1975); D. Robinson, Slavery in the Structure of American Politics 55-77 (New York,
1971); Edmund Morgan, "Slavery and Freedom: The American Paradox," 59 J. Am. Hist. 6
(1972). In the eyes of most white Americans, slaveholding and not, owning slaves facilitated
one's ability to be a free man while being enslaved demonstrated unfitness for freedom. See
Judith Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion 16 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991)
("black chattel slavery stood at the opposite pole from full citizenship and so defined it";
voting and earning constituted inclusion).
12. Gordon Wood, "Inventing American Capitalism," 41 N.Y. Rev. Bks. 44, 48 (9 June
1994) (review essay) (quoting approvingly Alan Kulikoff, The Agrarian Origins of American
Capitalism (Charlottsville, Va., 1994), and arguing that alternative cultural and economic
forms failed to survive much past the Revolution).
A contrary argument, that property and rights-based liberal individualism came to
America considerably later and from above, is found in Robert Wiebe, Self-Rule: A Cultural
History of American Democracy (Chicago, 1995). Even if republican ideas, including those
about property and liberty, were more deeply rooted and lasted longer than some of the scholarship claims, that ideology was hardly democratic; see Frank Michelman, "Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property," 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1319 (1987).
13. See, e.g., Jacob Talmon, The Origins of TotalitarianDemocracy (New York, 1960), and
the more recent work on ideology, hatred, etc., by Frangois Furet, Terrorisme et democratie
(Paris, 1985); id., Interpreting the French Revolution (New York, 1981); Lynn Hunt, The Family
Romance of the French Revolution, (Berkeley, Cal., 1992). Of course, as the history of Ameri-
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Lockeanism seems, for our first century at least, also to have been deeply
shared by America's white yeomanry and a considerable portion of the
working class, functioning, among other things, to exacerbate racism and

antislave
sentiment, as well as occasional hostility to corporations and
14
trUStS.

Perhaps chief among the "profound ideological and social conflicts"
rending early America was that between a producer yeomanry and an encroaching class of capitalist bankers and corporations. 15 Whereas the former, in both North and South, was shaped by and dedicated to an
"lassociational economy" and the cultural values of reciprocity among "middling producers" in Christian small towns, the latter was characterized by
speculative activities and manipulative practices. But whether the associational yeomanry was in any significant sense less Lockean or less interested
in its negative liberties than were its putative mercantile-corporate enemies
is certainly dubious. There is certainly much reason to believe that the same
constitutional values served both groups. 16 At any rate, ideological obeisance to small independent producers has been the worldwide stock in trade
of mercantilists, capitalists, and the jurists and politicians beholden to them
17
ever since the Roman republic the early Americans so much admired.

Early Americans supplemented their Locke with various English philosophical radicals as well as with French bourgeois revolutionaries. 18 There
seems no denying that the resulting natural (i.e, pre-political) rights model
can labor relations, for example, shows, matters could turn worse; see William Forbath, Law
and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 10-36 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991); Christopher
Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American Republic (New York, 1993).
14. On the liberty-property connection and the early American working class, see John
Ashworth, Agrariansand Aristocrats:Party Political Ideology in the United States (London, 1983)
(stressing rise of meritocracy and equality of opportunity as avenues for social progress); Sean
Wilentz, Chants Democratic:New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class (New
York, 1984) (articulation of same ideology by New York artisans and laborers, including antiblack aspects); Leonard Richards, "Gentlemen of Propertyand Standing": Anti-Abolition Mobs in
JacksonianAmerica (New York, 1970) (very propertylessness of blacks made them unfit to be
freemen); R. Morais, "The Sons of Liberty in New York," in Richard Morris, ed., The Era of the
American Revolution 269-89 (New York, 1965).
15. Tony Freyer, Producers versus Capitalists: Constitutional Conflict in Antebellum
America 11 (Charlottsville, Va., 1994).
On the doctrinal and social hostility toward corporate forms of property, see Stanley
Kuttler, Privilege and Creative Destruction: The Charles River Bridge Case (Philadelphia, 1971).
16. Freyer, supra note 15, at 10, 201; James Willard Hurst, Law and Markets in United
States History 97-98 (Madison, Wis., 1982). Freyer, at 8, claims that these "producer" values
combined with Protestant moralism to generate a free-labor, antislavery ideology.
17. See Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorshipand Democracy 484-508 (Boston,
1966) (Cato the Elder pioneered this discourse in the second century B.C.); Arno Mayer,
Dynamics of Counterrevolutionin Europe, 1870-1956 (New York, 1971).
18. See, e.g., Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (New York, 1976);
Kramnick, supra note 9, at 132. The nature and extent of French radical influence is difficult
to determine. Rousseau, for example, also contended that "[i]t is precisely because the force of
things always tends to destroy equality, that the force of legislation must tend to maintain it."
J. J. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social et Les Discours 220 (Paris, 1957 ed.), cited in Stanley Katz,
"The Strange Birth and Unlikely History of Constitutional Equality," 75 J. Am. Hist. 747
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helped overcome the status and power hierarchies of feudalism and monarchy. This strengthened democratic liberal individualism among white
Americans, at least-or especially-before the 1890s and the beginnings of
conscious working-class organization. Even then, after "natural rights" had
come to help naturalize a society in which inequality, insecurity, and
propertylessness had become the norm of industrial life, America's liberal,
property-based individualism with its focus on negative rights remained the
leitmotif of our society. It still provides an authoritative form through which
certain values become natural, common sense.
One result has been that even in those arenas of the law presumptively
removed from issues of property, property governs conceptualization and
discourse on all sides. Hence, the bounds of free speech are established by
corporations fighting state regulation; abortion debate hinges on a woman's
body as her property with which she may be free to do as she chooses; 19
privacy rights are predicated on the demarcation of territory that others dare
not invade; and criminal law rights, such as freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure, begin with a "reasonable expectation of privacy," which
emanates from control over property. Even pro bono litigation on behalf of
the homeless generally begins with efforts to establish a quasi-property right
over space occupied.20 The law, it seems, only listens to talk it can understand. More than anything, it understands property.
Notwithstanding much effort and resistance, we have been unable to
hinge even a right so basic and universally promoted as "speech" onto some
principle, like citizenship,2' located more than a step or two away from
property and defined positively rather than negatively. Conceptions of liberty expressed through contracts and markets can ohly be formal concep(1988). This element of Rousseau apparently did not make much of an impression in the early
Republic. W. Hugins, Jacksonian Democracy and the Working Class (Stanford, Cal., 1960).
19. For a thoroughgoingly logical statement of this classical position, see Susan LooperFriedman," 'Keep Your Laws Off My Body': Abortion Regulation and the Takings Clause," 29
New Eng. L. Rev. 253 (1995).
20. Such as the floor of Grand Central Station or "safe zones" under Interstate ramps in
Miami. See Jeremy Waldron, "Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom," 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
295 (1991).
21. U.S. Const., Amendment XIV, sec. 1 (1868), defines citizen and reads:
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Several points were encapsulated in the first sentence. Blacks were to be considered citizens
by virtue of birth here. States could not restrict either their own or national citizenship (one
of the Dred Scott issues). And all persons born or naturalized are full citizens. Radical interpre-

tations of the Fourteenth Amendment were turned back already in the Slaughter House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 LEd. 394 (1873); the potential power of the "equal protection" clause
was (re-)discovered almost a century later.
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tions. 22 Ignoring or declaring legally irrelevant "background inequalities"
among contracting parties is to ignore what probably animates the parties,
and simply defines necessity as freedom. 23 That legal neutrality which ignores economic, social, and political resources contributes palpably to reinforcing those preexisting inequalities. In turn, to argue that formal rights are

inadequate-that freedom of speech and of the press is virtually irrelevant
to the illiterate, for example-is surely not novel,24 and this essay will not

25
attempt to prove that once again.

Instead, I shall examine selectively the conception and structure of liberty as presented in American legal (and especially constitutional) debate. I
begin with a look at two junctures in American history during which the
critique of merely formal and property-contract based rights proceeded furthest. These two periods-Reconstruction and the New Deal-witnessed
social and legal challenges to the Lockean conception of rights. Both of
these periods sav politicians and judges confronting the inadequacy of negative liberty and common law understandings of contract. At each juncture,
after some progress, the impulse to escape formal property constraints was
turned back. Nevertheless, each of these two eras produced positions that
returned to the fore in the 1960s and 1970s. Propelled by the mobilizations
of those years, equal protection/fundamental rights jurisprudence again
chipped away at negative liberty. It is striking how much the 1960s and
1970s owed to Reconstruction and the New Deal. And, it is striking how
similar was the logic and politics that each time ended the progress: a politics and logic of property and negative liberty that we have, for the most
part, been unable as well as unwilling to transcend.
22. See Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right" 131-42 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1970); Franz Neumann, "The Change in the Function of Law in Modem Society," in H.
Marcuse, ed., The Democratic and AuthoritarianState 22-68 (Glencoe, Ill., 1957); id., "The
Concept of Political Freedom," 53 Colum. L. Rev. 901, 925 (1953). The most American
statement of this conception was provided by Robert Hale, "Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-coercive State," 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470, 472-77 (background distributions determine perception of what is coercive as against what is free or natural).
23. Thus, even introducing a putatively broader concept like "reliance" does not make
background inequalities relevant; see Joseph Singer, "The Reliance Interest in Property," 40
Stan. L. Rev. 614 (1988). At the end of the day, the assortment of interests marshaled by the
weaker party, bundled together as reliance, must withstand the same contract scrutiny as all
other terms. Nothing speaks more loudly in Singer's article than the pictures of the Ohio steel
mill being exploded.
24. The argument that liberty without equality is of minimal value and a great risk
comes up during nearly every period of social upheaval: Graccus Babeuf during the French
Revolution ("Manifesto of the Equals"); Boston seamen of 1779 (Lemish); the black geus de
couleur in New Orleans whose credo in 1865 was "no libertd without egalite' (McPherson, infra
note 33); the frustrated radicals of the New Deal; considerable forces within the Civil Rights
movement; etc.
25. See, e.g., the vital essays by Frank Michelman, "Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
through the Fourteenth Amendment," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969); id., "Traces of Self Government," 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1986); Susan Bandes, "The Negative Constitution: A Critique,"
88 Mich. L. Rev. 2271 (1990).
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II. THE CIVIL WAR AND POSITIVE LIBERTY
There is general agreement, most recently recast by Ackerman, that
the Civil War and Reconstruction marked a refounding of American government in which power was transferred to the national government and
the separation of powers (among branches of the federal government) replaced federalism (dividing power between national and state governments)
as chief guarantor of liberty. 26 But whether newly acquired and exercised
state power altered the American conception of liberty is a more complicated matter. The Civil War and the Republican "free labor," "free soil"
ideology also did much to further liberal-bourgeois individualist ideologyamong other ways by loosening the bonds of individual to community in
27
both North and South.
Pre-Civil War conceptions of liberty came to consist increasingly of
what Isaiah Berlin would call "negative" liberty.28 While antebellum law

knew and appreciated the police power of the Commonwealth, 29 and the
country itself had gone through a mercantilist phase with Whigs enjoying
considerable popular and elite support, Yankees for the most part nonetheless feared restraints, either feudal or collectivist, and the white South was
not very different in this respect. Both rejected excessive interference by
outside authority with individual behavior. While contract and property undergirded their paradigm for such liberty, power, especially public power,
30
was the prototypical menace to it.

26. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 45-46, 98-106 (Cambridge, Mass..
1991).
27. In this regard, and others, the Civil War was (part of) a bourgeois revolution: see
Moore, supra note 17, at 111-58; Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made (New
York, 1969); Whyte Holt, "Recovery by the Worker Who Quits," 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 677
(particular instance of attenuation of producers' affirmative duty to the public).
28. Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty 121-31 (London, 1969) ("Two Concepts of
Liberty," negative and positive, from and to). The standard criticism of this dichotomy is that
a person must be free from constraints in order to do an action; see Gerald MacCollum, "Negative and Positive Freedom," 76 Phil. Rev. 312 (1967). Arguably it is law that regulates the
relationship.
29. See esp. William Novak, "'Salus Populi': The Roots of Regulation in America,
1787-1873" chap. 1 (Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 1992); id., "Common Regulation: Legal
Origins of State Power in America," 45 Hastings LJ. 1061 (1994) (arguing for a long and
widely accepted tradition of government intervention in property, contract and other areas, at
least at local levels); id., "Public Economy and the Well-ordered Market: Law and Regulation
in 19th-Century America," 18 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1 (1993).
30. As one slave-owning libertarian put it: "If Congress can make banks, roads, and
canals under the Constitution, they can free any slave in the United States." Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina, quoted in N. Risjord, The Old Republicans 242 (New York, 1965). On
"liberalism" in the South, see James Oakes, Slavery and Freedom (New York, 1990).
When Justice Taney in Dred Scott insisted that the Missouri Compromise legislation
could not have freed Dred Scott, he was simultaneously underscoring the property-contractliberty connection of the slaveholder and denying the public power's (here, Congress's) authority to intervene in and disrupt that connection.
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At the same time, however, neither early in the 19th century nor late
in the 20th is economic regulation through law substantially averse to property, contract, or market. To assert otherwise would be mistakenly to equate
possessive individualism with mere chaos and capitalism with mere piracy.
Worse, it would suggest that the police power-the source of regulation-is
somehow adverse to the interests of property holders or of liberal capitalism
itself. All economy is "public" economy, 31 and an active political regime
underwrites the most free market of liberal and negative-liberty-based
economies.
The liberal spirit of negative liberty was from the start a powerful force
in the nation's laws and Constitution as well: 11 of the first 12 amendments
to the Constitution had limited the powers of the national government; 10
of the first 11 amendments focused on "shall nots." Arguably, America's
greatest libertarians could be slaveholders just as Europe's were politicaleconomy free marketeers.
Whereas negative liberty is vulnerable to politically organized power,
positive liberty depends on or is a form of it. State ambitions prosper during
wartime, and time and again positive liberty has grown during or in the
aftermath of war and mobilization. 32 The American Civil War was certainly
no exception. A coalition of radical Republicans, abolitionists, and free
soilers (alternatively, radical bourgeois, southern black workers, and elements of the northern working class) drove the war forward and engendered
a drive for a certain positive conception of liberty. Toward the end of the
war, the commander in chief of modem history's then largest mobilized
army, Abraham Lincoln, sought to define "liberty":
The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, and the
American people, just now, &remuch in want of one. We all declare
for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same
thing. With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he
pleases with himself, and the product of his labor; while with others
the same may mean for some men to do as they please with other men,
33
and the product of other men's labor.
31. Novak, 18 Law & Soc. Inquiry at 3-5 (supra note 29), rightly insists that the persistent notion of an emerging apolitical economy in antebellum America provides a grossly inaccurate picture of that society. At the same time, however, an earlier mercantilist form of legal
economic regulation did increasingly give way to the "freedom" of market-centered regulation; see, e.g., Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-46 (New
York, 1991).
32. See, e.g., Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism 146-209 (Oxford, 1988);
Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley, Cal., 1985); Theda Skocpol,
States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge, Mass., 1979); id., ProtectingSoldiers and Mothers: The
PoliticalOrigins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, Mass., 1992); Raymond Grew
et al., Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States (Princeton, NJ., 1977).
33. Speech of 18 April 1864, 7 Collected Works of Lincoln 301-2, cited in James McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution 43-44 (New York, 1991). Lincoln
continued, "We behold the processes by which thousands are daily passing from under the

11

12

LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY

Lincoln's conception of liberty rejected neither the market nor contract. Undoubtedly Lincoln appreciated, indeed incarnated, many a bourgeois virtue. But his was, at least inchoately, a positive form of liberty,
associated with public power and the power to. During the decade and a
half of Reconstruction, the break with a negative and formal conception of
rights was largely restricted to the area of political rights34-with which
social rights were often conflated or for which they were sometimes mistaken.35 Black and white Republican leaders alike focused on the suffrage
and urged that national state power be used to implement it. To accomplish
this, prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, they turned to the
"guarantee clause" of the Constitution, 36 in much the same way that the
New Deal positive state later turned to the Interstate Commerce Clause.
Appropriately enough, six of the first seven post-Civil War amendments dramatically extended the powers of the national government and
included the phrase "Congress shall have the power.. . ." The Civil Rights

Act of 1866, Reconstruction Acts of 1867, and constitutional amendments
XIII-XV created the potential to destroy "the states as separate and autonomous political entities" and laid the foundation for the exercise of a positive
liberty at least partially detached from property.3 7 Together they constituted
a "positive guarantee" of rights "that belong to all" and were, according to
the solicitor general, enacted "in the interest of freedom and civil liberty,
under a radical change in the fundamental law."38 Lest one think that the
legal inhibitions generated by the property-negative liberty ideology have
simply receded over time, it is sanguine to note that "federal judges in the
yoke of bondage, hailed by some as the advance of liberty, and bewailed by others as the
destruction of all liberty." Id. See also Ira Berlin & Barbara Fields, Free at Lost: A Documentary
History of Slavery, Freedom, and the Civil War (New York, 1992).
34. Thus, for example, the black New Orleans Tribune slid from the social to the political this way: "Emancipation is one fact, and effective liberty is another. No pariahs in
America! We demand, therefore, like all other citizens... the right to vote and the right to
be judged, treated, and governed according to equal laws ....No power can arrest the dlan
summoned forth by this revolution." La Tbune de laNouvelle Organs, 24 Jan. 1865, quoted in
McPherson, supra note 33, at 17.
35. Two and three decades earlier, the Chartist movement had also proven unable to
establish and effectuate a conceptual or practical connection between the political and the
social. The challenge of connecting democracy to the social has remained with us. Despite
much adulation and the recent contribution of the Chartist puzzle to the rise of discourse
analysis, the failure remains an historical milestone/millstone. See G. D. H. Cole, Chartist
Portraits (London, 1941); Dorothy Thompson, The Chartists (New York, 1984); and, especially, Gareth Steadman Jones, Languages of Class (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).
36. U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 4: "the United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government." The theory was that the white state governments
of the South were "aristocracies" and "oligarchies," hence subject to reconstruction.
37. Robert Kaczorowski, The Politics of JudicialInterpretation:The FederalCourts, Department of Justice and Civil Rights, 1866-1876 at xiii, 1-3 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1985); id., "Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction," 61 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
863 (1986).
38. Solicitor General Benjamin Bristow's brief in Blyew v. United States, quoted in Kaczorowski, Politics of Judicial Interpretation,supra note 37, at 139.
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early 1870's were decidedly more successful in enforcing civil rights than the
more recent federal judges who were charged with dismantling the Jim
39

Crow system."

By 1870 a majority of adult males in the United States worked for
someone else and no longer owned their own means of production. For
many, wage dependency was slowly being reconciled with liberty on the
basis of opportunities for upward and geographical mobility on the frontier
and elsewhere. Nevertheless, blacks and radical Republicans insisted that

positive liberty could not depend on legal equality alone but required property. During the war still, an ex-slave and Union soldier insisted that "Every
colored man will be a slave, & feel himself a slave until he can raise him
,4°
[sic] own bale of cotton & put him own mark upon it & say dis is mine!
Abolitionists agreed that "the nominal freedom of the slaves" must be made

real "by the possession of land ....

To give these people only freedom,

without the land, is to give them only the mockery of freedom which the

English or Irish peasant has."41
Thus, the linkage of property and positive liberty was, in a sense, to be
satisfied through the universalizationof property holding and its attendant
rights-a design whose lineage goes back to the 50 acres commitment of
Jefferson's Virginia Constitution. This universalization of property is a pecu-

liarly American presumption, although occasionally voiced demagogically
elsewhere, 42 and linked probably to the frontier ethos and widespread geographical mobility. It is difficult to overestimate the force-both material

and ideological-of this presumption. Universalizingproperty may, however,
be different from going beyond property. Attempts to universalize property
elide most questions of class and distribution: even if there were always
more property to make or to get, its distribution may tend toward a zero

sum. Where is the 40 acres and a mule for the freed slaves to come from that
will universalize property?43 Less than a decade after the Homestead Act
(1862), and as Reconstruction was still being forged, the Paris Commune

39. Id. at 131.
40. Quoted in McPherson, Abraham Lincoln, supra note 33, at 24.
41. National Anti-Slavery Standard, 18 May 1867, quoted in id.
42. The propaganda of the French left in revolutionary/reactionary moments, such as
1848-49, involved upholding and even expanding the rights of property and family so cherished on the right. Thus, Ledru-Rollin speaking to peasants and small shopkeepers maintained: "Property is liberty... we will therefore respect property, but on condition that'it will
be infinitely multiplied.., we do not want it for some; we want it for all." Cited in Roger
Price, The French Second Republic 202 (London, 1972).
43. Metaphorically speaking, the answer to this question may distinguish Reconstruction
radicalism as so wonderfully articulated by McPherson from the New Deal and socialist radicalism reported by, for example, C. B. Macpherson in his oeuvre; see, e.g., Life and Times of
Liberal Democracy (New York, 1977) and Rise and Fail of EconomicJustice (New York, 1987).
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may have offered a different kind of answer, one that did not, however,
44
make much impact in America.
The radical side to "Fourteenth Amendment politics" was only weakly
applied, and was then entirely abandoned with the end of Reconstruction.
The tensions within Reconstruction, indeed even within the radical wing of
Reconstruction itself, were such that the wall between the political and the
social could not be effectively scaled. As David Montgomery once put it:
Equality before the law within a securely unified nation ... was the
political goal toward which Radicals aspired. But beyond equality lay
demands of wage earners
to which the equalitarian formula provided
45
no meaningful answer.
The South, for example, never saw the creation of a class of independent
property-owning black farmers such as might have created a Jacobin peasantry and an altogether different course of development for the South and
the nation as a whole.46 Nevertheless, during the radical period and the
years of military occupation of the South, black farmers and laborers scored
significant economic advances, and African Americans held a larger proportion of public offices in the South than they do today. The counterrevolution that came after was a setback for all propertyless Americans, though
47
not all perceived it as such.
What followed was what DuBois called the "counter-revolution of
property" that lasted well into this century, perhaps into the 1930s. 48 In the
legal and political arena, the ascendance of a particular conception of property rights corresponded to a revival of negative liberty symbolized by a
44. In Marx's perception, at least, the Communards "wanted to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of production ... into mere instruments of free and
associated labor... Communism, 'impossible' Communism." Karl Marx, The Civil War in
France34 (187i Address to the International Working Men's Association) (New York, 1968).
45. David Montgomery, Beyond Equality: Labor and the Radical Republicans 1862-1872 at

x (Urbana, Ill., 1981); see Eric Foner, Nothing but Freedom (Baton Rouge, La., 1983).
46. See Antonio Gramsci, The Modem Prince and Other Writings 28-51, and the implicit
development debate in Rosario Romeo, Storia del Mezzogiorno (Rome, 1986), and Breve storia
della grande industriain Italia, 1861-1961 (Bologna, 1980) (all discussing "the Southern Question"). See also Eric Foner, Reconstruction 235-36 (New York, 1989) (potential impact of
radicals' plans to redistribute rebels' plantation lands and create free black peasant-farmers).
47. See generally Foner, supra note 46. Certainly, it was in defense of rights grounded in
private property, such as contracting rights, that the reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
was narrowed so as to invalidate Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Laws. Similarly, raising the
state action threshold constituted a defense of the primacy of private property rights. See the
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873), United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1875), Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896).
48. W. E. B. DuBois, Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880 at 580-636, 670-710
(New York, 1935) (northern capital joined southern elite to liquidate progress of Reconstruction; regression back toward peonage and slavery followed). As DuBois shows, non-elite
whites were also set back by the liquidation of Reconstruction-although the dream of property obviously stood a better chance of realization for whites.
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weakening of national government. The majority in the Slaughter House
Cases of 1873 averred that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment could
not have meant as a general principle to "fetter and degrade the state governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress." And with that,
nearly all the civil rights and material gains crucial to the freedmen were
49
returned to state jurisdiction.
In 1883 the Supreme Court invalidated the public accommodations
section of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, largely because it infringed on the
property rights and attendant liberties of those who owned facilities or did
not care to share them with blacks. The Court rejected the position that the
real abolition of slavery required the abolition of its material "badges and
incidents," which in turn required either the universalizationof property or
the transcendence of property as the basis of liberty.50 Legally, the die may
well have been cast eight years earlier when federal power and the definition of state action were both restricted in United States v. Cruikshank.51
Absent statutory discrimination by state governments, discriminatory acts
by individuals lay beyond Congress. Ordinary crime was a matter for the
states which, under the circumstances, meant that government action to
underpin liberty was barred. It was barred because the Court accepted the
defense argument 52 of negative liberty: conviction would produce "immediate consolidation of the whole land into a consolidated empire." With revolutionary pressures gone, the Court could begin a period in which it oversaw
the growth of American capitalism, dispensing Fourteenth Amendment beneficence upon corporations as legal persons, whose liberties were entitled
49. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83. The Court did accept that the 1866 Civil
Rights Act meant to afford all races equal contractual rights with whites: "full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens." In other words, the rights of the minority are tied to those of the dominant
group. The case is thoroughly and persuasively analyzed in Kaczorowski,supra note 37, at
143-66. Compare the gloss on the case in Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 418 (Mineola,
N.Y., 1985), where the concern expressed is that for negative liberty, freedom from the tentacles of the encroaching state. Hence, too, Gunther makes no mention of the fact that one
immediate consequence of the decision was the Attorney General's suspension of prosecutions of Klansmen under the 1870 and 1871 enforcement acts.
50. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) ("the wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any [state] authority, is simply a private wrong").
51. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). Again, Gunther's presentation, at 864, is deceptive: Cndkshank
"involved an indictment under [the 1870 Enforcement Act]. Three persons were convicted of
participating in the lynching of two blacks." No where does Gunther mention that the case
stemmed from the most outrageous carnage of the period, the "Colfax Massacre" of 1873, in
which about 100 blacks and 3 whites were killed in a deliberate massacre. The Justice Department indicted nearly 100 men for conspiracy to deprive the victims of their civil rights. Compare Kaczorowski, supra note 37, at 202-20.
52. Made by John Campbell of Alabama, a former U.S. Supreme Court justice who
resigned in 1861 to serve the Confederacy. His argument is quoted by Kaczorowski, supra note
37, at 210-11. Kaczorowski, at 220, also cites the remarks of one lawyer in 1878 to the effect
that "fear of the advancing strides of an imperial despotism" was bringing the American people back to their senses.
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to the same protection as nonfictitious persons, while also blocking many
53
labor activities as obstructions of the free market.
Property now reigned triumphant and did so with hegemonic plausibility, facilitated perhaps by resumed and now even accelerated national expansion. Into the middle of the 19th century, many European observers had
believed that the American experiment in wedding capitalism-the guaranteed inequality of property-and democratic forms simply could not
work. In a critique of Jeffersonianism, Thomas Macaulay wrote to an American friend:
[I]nstitutions purely democratic must, sooner or later, destroy liberty or
civilization or both. In Europe, where the population is dense, the effect of such institutions would be almost instantaneous. What happened lately in France [1848] is an example. Your fate I believe to be
certain, though it is deferred by a physical cause.... As long as you
have a boundless extent of fertile and unoccupied land ... Jefferson
politics may continue.., without causing any fatal calamity .... [But]
your Government will never be able to restrain a distressed and discontented majority. For with you the majority is the Government, and has
at its mercy .... Your
the rich, who are always a minority, absolutely
Constitution is all sail and no anchor.5 4
By the end of the century, however, many Europeans thought that
America was the only way that capitalism and formal democracy could coexist. Hence Law Lord Bramwell, a Liberal, worried in 1885 about rising
class hatreds in England, averred:
I believe that the best thing for all is that there should be what I believe the Americans call "the largest pile" [sic?]. Though the shares
may be unequal, there will be the greatest bulk to divide, the greatest

53. See, e.g., Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); Morton

Horwitz, The Transformationof American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, Mass., 1977); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Enterprise andAmerican Law 1836-1937 at 42-56 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991). At
the same time, the dedication of the courts to a free market helped introduce a prolonged
period of judicial hostility toward labor organization. Beginning in the 1870s or 1880s, conspiracy prosecutions and injunctions barring picketing, organizing, boycotting, etc., became
the distinctive government approach to labor strife. Forbath, supra note 13, at 59-97.
54. Macaulay to H. S. Randall (author of a two-volume life of Jefferson), 23 May 1857,
in G. 0. Trevelyan, 2 The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay 407-10 (New York, 1875).
Of course, Marx in both The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York, 1852)
and Class Struggles in France 1848-50 (New York, 1850) also emphasized the long-term incompatibility of democracy and capitalism. Law's role in mediating this contradiction has
recently been restated by Morton Horwitz, The Transformationof American Law, 1870-1960 at
9 (New York, 1992): "The fundamental issue of American political thought was how this
politically most democratic country in the world could avoid the threat of coerced economic
equality."
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average share, the greatest amount of enjoyment, the 5greatest individual wealth, perhaps, but the least individual poverty.
Even in this period, there were to be sure insurgents and even mass
upheavals: Homestead, for example, was without doubt one of the greatest
strikes in the history of capitalism. Not long before that strike, Daniel De
Leon, one of America's Socialist Labor leaders, interjected a dissident, more
pessimistic view of the state of Madison's property-rights nexus. Madison
had
devised our present duplex system... intended to be a check on popular impulses, and, at the same time, a concession to republican instincts. .

.

. [I]ts efficacy was, however, grounded upon the actual

distribution of property in the United States, and the universal hope of
acquiring it.

But Madison's Malthusian pessimism had proven justified: The hope of
universal property or universal hope of property had, apparently, run its
course. Capitalism and immigration were together seeing to it that
the large majority of the people of this country would finally touch the
point where they would be, not only without property, but without even
the hope of acquiringit.... [Cihance or intrigue, cautious crime or toadying, may, but no degree of honest toil can any longer, under the prevailing system, insure property . . . to the myriad wealth-producing

56
workers with brain or brawn.

Dissidents aside, in the prevailing view, which won over both workers and
immigrants, the breadth of property holding made of the United States a
beacon, the city on the hill. For some beneficiaries, the light has never
stopped shining. Others have just been invisible in the dark.
From the end of the 19th century through the first third of the 20th,
wars of manoeuver yielding unstable equilibria were more common-in areas as diverse as antitrust 57 and women's rights 5 8-in the property wars than
55. C. Fairfield, Some Account of George William Wilshere Baron Bramwell of Hever and
His Opinions 252 (London, 1898) (1885, context of quotation unclear). This was one of the
lines of thought that culminated in Werner Sombart, Why Is There No Socialism in the United
States? (London, 1905).
56. Daniel De Leon, "The Voice of Madison," Nationalist 1 (Aug. 1889). On the dark
side of Madison's pessimism, workhouses along with property, see Drew McCoy, The Elusive
Republic: Political Economy of Jeffersonian America 125-29 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980).
57. "Antitrust" was one of the leading areas of law demonstrating the uncertain struggles
and unstable equilibria of the period(s). See Martin Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of
American Capitalism, 1890-1916 (Cambridge & New York, 1988) (producers big and small,
consumers, labor, progressives, corporate liberals, and nostalgic yeomen all contributed to an
evolving antitrust law).
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were fierce battles of position like Reconstruction/Redemption and the New
Deal.

III. THE PROPERTYLESS POSITIVE LIBERTIES OF
THE NEW DEAL
The period between the rollback of Reconstruction and the emergence
of the New Deal may have marked the high point of negative liberty, free
property, and contract jurisprudence. The apogee of that activist jurisprudence is generally identified with Lochner v. New York, one of a series of
cases invalidating state health and protective legislation on the grounds
that the freedom/obligation of contract of free men and women citizens was
being impaired.5 9 Never again did the market appear so natural, adequate,
and dispositive of liberty. Never again did the formal equality of contract so
fully displace the social realities that produce contract relations. In this
view, exchanges of property in the market are not only guaranteed freedom
but were indeed the very expression of it. As Edward Corwin later put it,
the Court's goal seemed to be to "annex the principles of laissez-faire capitalism to the Constitution and put them beyond the reach of state legisla60
tive power."
What those negative liberties in fact represented, however, was arguably the apogee of power of capital at the national and judicial levels: the
invalidation of labor legislation, of state bans on yellow-dog contracts, manufacturing health laws, partial constriction of railroad and antitrust popu-

58. For a broad argument addressing areas (such as women's rights) where the radicalism
of antislavery never died out, see Hendrik Hartog, "The Constitution of Aspiration and 'The
Rights that Belong to Us All,'" 74J. Am. Hist. 1013 (1987). Alas, it must also be noted that
the Fifteenth Amendment is the first place where the Constitution explicitly speaks of citizens as men only. See Ellen DuBois, "Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers," 74 J. Am.
Hist. 833, 845-48 (1987). On women and property in the public and private spheres of the
day, Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law (Ithaca, N.Y., 1982).
59. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a New York
law limiting bakers' weekly work hours to 60. State courts did much the same. In 1886, for
example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down legislation requiring that miners and
iron workers be paid at least monthly and in legal tender rather than company-store scrip.
The law was an effort "to do what, in this country cannot be done, that isprevent persons...
from making their own contracts," "to put the laborer under a legislative tutelage, which is
not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen." Godcharles v.
Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (1886). Fear not, womanhood also merited freedom. Thus, Illinois's law
of 1895 limiting the weekly labor of women in "factory or workshop" to 48 was a "restriction
upon the fundamental rights of the citizen to control his or her own time and faculties."
Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 155 Il1.98 (1895). But see Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366
(1898) (upholding Utah law limiting smelters and ore-refining and underground workers to 8hour day).
60. Edward Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court 78 (Hamden, Conn., 1934).
Corwin, of course, held this to be an illegitimate or arbitrary annexation or arrogation.
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lism, ad infinitum. 6 1 Yet in a peculiar and distinct way, Lochner's negative
liberties do somehow underlie personal liberties, right to privacy, educational
"freedoms," etc.
Anticommunitarian, individual rights may have been expanded. At
the very least, a kind of public noninterventionism was privileged: In the
educational arena, for example, key Court cases of the mid-1920s made certain that we would never have a French-style educational system with its
national uniformity, solidarity, and singularity. 62 On the other hand, as the
Sixteenth (1913) and Nineteenth Amendments (1920) make clear, some
progressive impulses remained immune to Court revision and available for
later political and legal reference.
It was only when the economic and political domination of economic
elites weakened in the face of economic crisis and mass mobilization that
Lochnerism too waned. 63 Facing popular struggles, party realignments, and
economic disaster, the thought ways of justice were opened again to conceptions of positive liberty barely heard from since the Reconstruction years, not
even in the heyday of Progressivism. Freedom to pervaded the agendas of
the courts. Although strict property-contract conceptions yielded ground in
several areas, nowhere, arguably, was this more the case than in the area of
work and labor relations. Classically, the contract between the employer/
capitalist and employee/worker lay outside politics, so that, for example, the
total exclusion of workers from control at the workplace could in no way be
construed as an infringement of the political rights of workers.
No doubt, labor law is essentially a product of that period in recent
history when governments tinkered with corporatist responses to social and
economic crises and workers and unions threatened the overall stability of
61. As in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (nullifying state's anti-yellow-dog law),
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (banning yellow-dog contracts on interstate
railways), Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (overturning minimum wages
for women in the District of Columbia), New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932)
(barring state regulation of ice makers), Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (striking
down law prohibiting employment agencies from collecting fees from workers), Weaver v.
Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402 (1926) (invalidating state prohibition on use of shoddy or filthy
rags in manufacture of mattresses and quilts).
62. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law banning the teaching of German, opinion by McReynolds, J.), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking an Oregon law requiring all students to attend public schools).
63. But see Cass Sunstein, "Lochner's Legacy," 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987), where
Lochnerism is, unnecessarily I think, given a broader and more polyvalent definition. A shift
in "baselines" becomes possible when the material reality underlying the rationales for prior
baselines makes those older baselines untenable. In this regard, Sunstein's review of Ackerman's reverential, if not adulatory, view of the New Deal (Ackerman, supra note 25, at
100-127, 153-62) is at odds with his own view of Lochnerism as well as with his own antagonism toward the regulatory state, which was, after all, as much as anything what the New Deal
was about. See Sunstein, "Constitutionalism after the New Deal," 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421
(1987), and New Republic, 20 Jan. 1992, at 32; Kenneth Casebeer, "Teaching an Old Dog
New Tricks: Coppage v. Kansas and At-Will Employment Revisited," 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 765
(1985).
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society. Even the law was forced to recognize classes-whose conflicts and
communities were then routinized and institutionalized by it. Collectivism
was a prerequisite for greater democracy.64 The law placed considerable faith
in enlightened (and democratic) state administration and coupled that faith
to the vision of industrial democracy articulated by Senator Robert Wagner
and others. At its core, therefore, it accepted collectivism, paternalism, and
community while rejecting both the free labor market and socialism.

65

Whether ultimately successful or not, the NLRA system sought to mirror or
appropriate the reality of working-class collectivity and community life by
fostering a sense of solidarity among workers and promoting participation in
decision-making processes at the workplace.
"The legal substance of labor law," as one commentator put it, lay "in
the recognition of classes by the law." 66 This anticontractarian admission
was meant to and did temper the employer's power to command by virtue of
property. Ultimately too, it was collectivist, offering "a vision of collective
empowerment, or of the creation of a right in a collectivity, in which individuals participate only as they participate in that collectivity, and on its
terms." 67 However indirectly, New Deal labor law and court decisions rejected the naturalness of bourgeois property-contract assumptions. 68 They
acknowledged politics as at least coequal to economics and dissociated
"common law" from the simple capitalist political economy it had for so
long-pace E. P. Thompson-tended to reflect.6 9 Although at least the
courts ultimately rejected a collectivist-corporatist model for the economy
64. See, e.g., Kenneth Casebeer, "Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling
on Drafting the Wagner Act," 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 285 (1987) (discussion of the issues
adverted to here); Forbath, supra note 13. Forbath stresses the democratic over the collective.
No case makes the connection, I think necessary, better than J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 332 (1944) (discussion of NLRA § 9, only one voice on each side of collective
bargaining).
65. These points are no longer considered controversial, merely historical, in the disparaging sense. For a sincere commitment, see Clyde Summers, H. Wellington, & A. Hyde,
Labor Law: Cases and Materials 896-936 (Mineola, N.Y., 1983).
66. Hugo Sinzheimer, quoted in 0. Kahn-Freund, Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar
Republic 81 (R. Lewis & J. Clark, eds., 1981).
67. Charles Fried, "Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations," 51 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1012, 1028 (1984).
68. As Karl Polanyi put it in 1944:
To separate labor from other activities of life and to subject it to the laws of the market
was to annihilate all organic forms of existence and to replace them by a different type of
organization, an atomistic and individualistic one.
Such a scheme of destruction was best served by the application of the principle of
freedom of contract. In practice this meant that the noncontractual organizations of
kinship, neighborhood, profession and creed were to be liquidated since they claimed the
allegiance of the individual .... To represent this principle as one of noninterference...
was merely the expression... in favor of a definite kind of interference, namely such as
would destroy noncontractual relations between individuals and prevent their spontaneous reformation.
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation 163 (Boston, 1957).
69. Thompson's excessive regard for the role of the law in mitigating class oppression
and arbitrariness has become something of a chestnut-cited to prove, almost regardless of
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as a whole, labor relations themselves were allowed to move out from under
pure market determination.

70

Some of the most explicit Court language abandoning market hegemony appeared in cases upholding government regulatory legislation. Thus,
the New York legislature's creation of a Milk Control Board to fix wholesale
and retail prices was upheld in Nebbia v. New York. There the Court
averred:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of private and not public concern. The
general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But
neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment
of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest. 7'
Such a statement hardly represents rejection of the fundamentals of capitalism or property-based rights. But it does somehow condition them or restrain them by asserting the existence of social purpose and collective
citizenship, not only as realities but as reasons for government's very
existence.
The conditioning and restraining perspective was enunciated even
more clearly in West Coast Hotel v. Panish. 72 In upholding a state minimum
wage law for women, the majority wrote that the legislature was entitled to
consider that women were
in the class receiving the least pay, that their bargaining power is relatively weak, and that they are the ready victims of those who would
take advantage of their necessitous circumstances. The legislature was
the time and place being discussed, that author and reader are in the right business after all.
Wigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act 258-66 (London, 1975).
70. The judicial rejection of collectivist corporatism was registered by invalidating the
NIRA; see Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating Bituminous Coal Conservation Act and
industrial codes).
The Court chose the commerce power as the pillar on which to lean in upholding the
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937), and the Wages and Hours Act in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
71. 291 U.S. 502, 506 (1934). On the connection of Nebbia and related cases to the
secular extension of the "police power" in industrial society, see Novak, 45 Hastings LJ., supra
note 29 (arguing for a long and widely accepted tradition of government intervention in
property, contract, and other areas). On the Court's pre-1934 rejection of such logic, see
Forbath, supra note 13. On the recent return of the earlier logic, see Cynthia Estlund, "Labor,
Property and Sovereignty after Lechmere," 46 Stan. L. Rev. 305 (1994).
72. 300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937) (decided 5-4) (reversing Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)). This was the case in which Justice Roberts's "switch in time
saved the Nine."
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entitled to reduce the evils of the "sweating system," the exploiting of
workers at wages so low as to be insufficient to meet the bare cost of
living, thus making their very helplessness the occasion of a most injurious competition.
...The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal
position with respect to bargaining power.., is not only detrimental to
their health and well being but casts a direct burden for their support
upon the community .... [The] community is not bound to provide
what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers. The community may direct its law-making power to correct the abuse which
springs from their selfish disregard of the public interest.
This was about as far as the Supreme Court would go in characterizing property as the fount of "selfish disregard of the public interest." It did so in the
depths of the Great Depression and in the face of mass popular mobilizations which insisted that the community support those who were relatively
helpless in the competitive market. By American standards, New Deal labor
law was quite a collectivist achievement, providing a countertendency for
Americans who "grew up in a society which'73stressed the ideals of classlessness, individual initiative, and opportunity.
As FDR and the New Dealers shifted the bulk of their efforts from
social and economic reform to winning the war, impulses toward positive
74
liberties began to wane, or at least take a back seat in most areas. Notwithstanding FDR's January 1944 call for a social, "Second Bill of Rights," and
unprecedentedly large and mobilized labor movements, the reform opportu75
nities of the time had largely exhausted themselves. Then, just as "Redemption" stopped and then reversed the conception of positive liberty that
emerged out of the Civil War and Reconstruction, so the "Cold War"
stopped and then reversed the conception of positive liberty that had
emerged out of the New Deal and international popular front.
73. Derek Bok, "Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law," 84
Harv. L. Rev. 1394, 1402 (1971). Bok, "Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law

and Economics," 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226 (1960), contains a telling analysis of how antilabor,
antitrust, and anticollectivism images of Jeffersonian yeomanry dominated the congressional
debates of the 1940s and 1950s. For the ways in which analogous "functions" were/are accomplished in American labor relations, see Kenneth Casebeer, "Unemployment Insurance:
American Social Wage, Labor Organization and Legal Ideology," 35 B.C.L. Rev. 259 (1994).
74. See, e.g., Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New DealLiberalism in Recession and War
(New York, 1995) (arguing this thesis and FDR's movement from Dr. New Deal to Dr. Winthe-War; racial issues a possible exception).
75. Those historians who seek to underscore the continued possibility of substantial reform through the end of the Roosevelt years tend to stress, correctly, the availability of mass
support for social initiatives. See, e.g., Nelson Lichtenstein, "From Corporatism to Collective
Bargaining: Organized Labor and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Post-War Era," in
Steven Fraser & Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order 122-52
(Princeton, NJ., 1989); Steven Fraser, Labor Will Rule: Sidney Hillman and the Rise of American
Labor (New York, 1991). See infra at 58.
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The net result, not entirely unlike that of early Weimar Germany, may
have been a "blocked historical possibility." 76 The Taft-Hartley Act and the
campaign on its behalf, the purging of Communists and their sympathizers,
legislation like the Robinson-Patman Act aiming to disestablish collectivism and restore the free market, court cases like InternationalLongshoremen's
Local 37 v. Boyd upholding the McCarran-Walter Act, and dozens of related
developments helped put an older and more entrenched understanding of
liberty and property back in the cultural and legal saddle.
Nonetheless, a body of law had been allowed to develop that established the welfare state and its mitigation of the principles of negative liberty embodied in property-based contractual understandings. That new
"baseline" has not been eradicated. In this sense, once the New Deal
"moved the capital from Wall Street to Washington," it could not be moved
back in its entirety. Nor could the enlargement of democratic participation
be entirely undone-for long.

IV. EQUAL PROTECTION AND FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS: THE FATE OF CITIZENSHIP VERSUS
PROPERTY CONCEPTIONS
It is impossible here even to begin to do justice to the transformation
of equal protection, substantive due process, and fundamental rights doctrines accomplished by the Warren and early Burger Courts. Those achievements have been widely recorded, and some have acknowledged its limits as
well. Many of the key cases can best be understood as the application of
Reconstruction and/or New Deal principles.7 7 On the other hand, as we
shall see, the more problematic victories of the period, such as those in the
areas of privacy, abortion, and welfare, were not anchored in positive conceptions of liberty at all but instead, like the free-speech cases, represented
efforts to extend purely negative conceptions of liberty grounded in property and property rights. At their most aggressive, these cases moved toward
establishing rights equivalent to property, albeit in a tenuous and vulnerable
way.
76. The phrase is from Barrington Moore, Injustice 376-97 (White Plains, N.Y., 1978).
77. Brown v. Board of Education, 344 U.S. 1 (1954); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), to name but a few. Arguably the most powerful
of these cases-Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); and Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)-were most
directly tied to Reconstruction-em efforts. Likewise, the most significant subsequent retreats,
as in the "state action area"-Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Flagg
Brothers v. Brooks, 486 U.S. 149 (1978); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)-were
repudiations of the same Reconstruction/New Deal advances.
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In this most recent period, as in those preceding ones, "property"

proved to be and to provide the central ideological node. In one of the most
passionate and influential legal essays of recent years, a presumptively radical Charles Reich argued in 1964 for "new property" 7S-for new bases from
within which persons could protect themselves against an encroaching
state. But Reich fully adopted the classical natural-rights, property basis of
personal autonomy as well as the negative conception of liberty. Property
was the source and guarantor of an individual's freedom, while the state,
now backed by mechanical and manipulable majorities, posed a constant
threat to individual liberty.7 9 Rights therefore seemed to exist outside the
state, outside politics, rather than at their very heart.
Individual freedom remained defined in the language of negative liberty: "power [is] to be feared" while "[1liberty is the right to defy the majority"-an immunity. Security and freedom could only lie in property
ownership. Although it appears that those who own property have generally
agreed, obtaining property has proven to be a more difficult matter, one
which over the past two centuries has grown more difficult rather than less,
notwithstanding an astronomical rise in society's production of goods.8 0
But rather than seeking a grounding for rights in citizenship, progressive tax-based transfers, or something not dependent on possessing property,
Reich's popular, would-be radical clarion call sought a broader dispersal or
distribution of property in various forms so that more members of society
could defend themselves against the state and each other. Indeed, Reich's
article and its influence testify loudly to the hold of property-based negative
liberty ideologies across the entire American legal and political system.
Property for all, but how? Given the near-ceaseless process of concentration
of the ownership of productive property over the past 150 years,8 1 Reich's
78. Reich, "The New Property," 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).
79. Id. at 768-74. It seems to me that a certain wrong-headedness runs through this
article. One reason for it was Reich's conception of Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960),
as an attack on accrued property rights in the name of a new, "monstrous and oppressive"
"'public interest,'" mass democracy state feudalism. He should have seen Nestor for what it
simply was: Court rationalization of the persecution of a Communist who had been deported
in 1956 but who had the audacity to demand his social security money. In effect, Reich treats

official McCarthyism, as a phenomenon of mass democracy-a not uncommon perspective in the
early 1960s, even on the Left.
80. This has never been a problem for conservatives, whose most familiar argument has
been that production itself takes care of redistributive issues by increasing everyone's share of
the pie without conflict over respective slice sizes. More subtle versions do exist, incorporating maxims such as limiting unearned income, guaranteeing the fruits of labor and savings,
etc. See J. Riley, "Justice under Capitalism," in J.Chapman & J.Pennock, eds., Markets and
Justice: Nomos XXXI at 122-62 (New York, 1989). Riley in fact stresses that Madison himself
in 1791 wrote favoring laws "which, without violating the rights of property, reduce extreme
wealth towards a state of mediocrity, and raise extreme indigence toward a state of comfort."
81. As always, the data are rich and contradictory. If we take one indicator, percentage
of the national wealth held by the top 1%of the population, an able but not exclusive standin for the actual issue, we find the following: from 1776 to the Homestead Act (1862), the
percentage doubled (from 14.6 to 29) in a straight linear fashion. The Homestead Act and the
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"property romanticism," as some might dub it, like the "greening of
America," failed to materialize. What was needed, according to many of the
most dedicated legal minds, was a broader definition and firmer anchoring
or vesting of property, so that more Americans could enjoy its benefits.
What "new property" talk did help engender was an extended judicial
conception of "stake," a kind of property right in due process. The consummation of new property argumentation was Justice Brennan's opinion in
Goldberg v. Kelly. 82 There it was held, in a case involving a unilateral New
York City decision to cancel a recipient's welfare benefits on the grounds of
ineligibility, that the possibility of entitlement to welfare assistance was
property enough to require due process before being terminated. The entitlement was to be treated as the property of the recipient, and not as the
government's grant to be conferred or withdrawn as the government saw fit.
Since, by the logic of having two contending parties, courts balance, Brennan added that the government's interest in conserving resources could not
override the economic desperation of those who possessed the entitlement
that might be withdrawn. Similar logic was used to invalidate residency re83
quirements for public assistance and medical aid.
As a series of key rulings in the early 1970s made clear, when pressed,
the "new property" proved chimerical. As a kind of poor man's substitute for
money or 40 acres and a mule-to be obtained whence we do not know-it
ultimately drowned in cost-benefit analysis.8 4 So-called welfare rights
proved a luxury that had to yield to states' fiscal constraints, as constructed
seizure of some southern Rebel lands led to a decline to 27% in 1870. From 1870 to 1929
(stock market crash), concentration again rose in a fairly linear fashion from 27 to 42.6%,
Progressivism notwithstanding. By 1933 the crash and crisis of capitalism drove the figure
down to 32.1%, but by 1938 it was back to 35.1%. For good reasons did the rich hate the New
Deal: welfarist programs reduced the figure to 26.1036 by 1943. Taft Hartley and Cold War
measures brought the figure back to 30% by the early 1950s. It hovered at around 30% until
1973 but then tumbled very quickly and briefly during the 1973-75 stock deflation to 17.6%,.
By 1982 it was back up to 31% and has risen steadily since to over 36.5%, the highest concentration of wealth since 1929. Claudia Goldin et al., New York Times, 16 Aug. 1992, at E3. See
Edward Wolff & Marcia Marley, "Long Term Trends in U.S. Wealth Inequality," in R. Lipsey
& H. Tice, eds., The Measurement of Saving, Investment and Wealth 765 (Chicago, 1991). To
be sure, there have been definite countertendencies, the greatest and most important being a
doubling of home ownership in this century.
Still, it is a safe and accurate summary fact to state that the welfare state worked to
decrease inequality and that the undermining of the welfare state has had the opposite effect.
See Edward Wolff, Top Heavy: A Study of the IncreasingInequality of Wealth in America (New
York, 1995); Bennett Harrison, Falling Wages and Growing Inequality in America (New York,
1987).
82. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (citing Reich, esp. in note 8); Hon. Cesar Persales, "The Legacy of Goldberg v. Kelly: A Twenty Year Perspective, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 889 (1991).
83. Respectively, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (residency requirements
violated freedom of travel, an inchoate property right in the taxpayer facilities of one's new
community; welfare benefits could be eliminated altogether, but discrimination against new
arrivals impermissible); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
84. I.e., the regnant approach of Matthews v. Eldridge, 425 U.S. 319 (1976).
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by "tax rebellions," corporate mobility, etc. 85 Already in 1970, more on account of the law's logic than of any incipient right turn in American social
policy, the Court in Dandridge v. Williams86 upheld ceilings on welfare benefits independent of family size. The Justices did so not so much, as they
claimed, because the state's action was "rational" and "free from invidious
discrimination" as because the new property had no cash value: it did not
"encourag[e] gainful employment... [defer to families] supported by a wage
earner ... provid[e] incentives for family planning," etc.
Two years later, Board of Regents v. Roth87 emphasized that the Constitution safeguarded property-defined as "interests that a person has already
acquired"-but that "[piroperty interests, of course, are not created by" the
Constitution. In other words, the Constitution protects the fruits of one's
labor, market gains, or luck, but it does not provide or require the provision
of such fruits. Nothing entitled a professor with a one-year contract at a
state university to an explanation for his subsequent nonrenewal. Whatever
his expectations, he had not in fact acquired a renewal of his contract,
which the state then subsequently sought to take away. The acquisition of
property, like its possession, had in American law begun reverting to its
more classical forms."" The legitimacy of acquisition (and with it fairness of
opportunity) perforce limits the legitimacy of (re-)distribution (and with it
justice in outcomes). Legal, contractarian processes have not and cannot become a form of property, no matter how central they have actually become
in our lives.

During the heyday of the Great Society, real transformation took place
in the area of "tenants' rights." The contract principle had been extended to
embrace a view of specific performance that often contained an "implied
warranty of habitability," an obligation incumbent on the property owner to
maintain the leased premises in habitable condition-but without under85. See, e.g., James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York, 1973); Frances
Fox Piven & James Cloward, Regulating the Poor (New York, 1971); id., The New Class War
(New York, 1982).
86. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). For the dangers of even a half-way recognition of the legitimate primacy of the market economy, see Michelman, "Foreword," supra note 25.
87. 408 U.S. 564, 567 (1972).
88. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972): "this Court has made clear that
a person has no 'right' to a valuable government benefit and ... the government may
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons."
Under Chief Justice Rehnquist, new property has fizzled out: see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134 (1974) (property interest in tenured civil service position limited by procedural limitations accompanying grant of tenure); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (interest in one's
good name is not a protectable property right).
Interestingly, one of the critics of Nedelsky, supra note 6, chides her for "failure to consider the additional material prosperity introduced by a system of private property ...
[Pirotection for private property is far easier to attack in a zero-sum society than in a world
where private property creates incentives that encouragea better life for all." T. Merrill, "Zero Sum
Madison," 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1392, 1393 (1992) (review of Nedelsky) (emphasis added).
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mining the power of ownership and disposition.8 9 Once this form of new

property left the confines of contractarian product liability and appeared
before the Supreme Court as a due process/equal protection question, it too
proved etherial. Lindsey v. Normet established that there was no fundamental interest (i.e., citizenship claim) to "decent shelter" or "possession of
one's home," 90 even if these were "particularly important to the poor."
Americans enjoy no "constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a
particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the
real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease" or without payment of rent. As with a job, so with an abode: only that property which one
already has will be equally protected.
William Simon has squarely identified the perversity of the New Property/Welfare Rights legal strategies and achievements, particularly as they
came to substitute for an aggressive politics of redistribution. Simon begins
by noting that "the central substantive theme of liberal welfare discourse
[has been] the analogy of welfare benefits to traditional private law norms
associated with contract and property."91 That theme is entirely commensurate with the American liberal, property-based conception of rights and citizenship discussed here. Above all, the regnant strategy is
linked to an ideal of individual independence and self-sufficiency and
to an ambition to immunize distributive arrangement from collective
reassessment and revision. On a practical level, it is linked to an aversion to direct or explicit redistribution. 92
Simon concludes that, having sublimated and repressed the issue of redistribution, the dominant new property/welfare paradigm only worsened the
political vulnerability of need-based transfers while "its individualist premises and rhetoric seem inimical to the more plausible political or policy responses" to gross social inequality. 93
Chastened by the 1970s and depressed by the early 1980s, progressive
heirs of the new property argument turned to a more "pragmatic" and immanent approach. Reformers, jurists, and professors now attempted to go with
89. See esp. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and
the other Skelly Wright cases. Unfortunately, of course, the right to move out without paying
the rent when the apartment becomes uninhabitable does not put a roof over one's head. It
may at best function to keep shoddy goods off the official market.
90. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
91. William H. Simon, "Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System," 38 Stan. L.
Rev. 1431-32 (1986).
92. Id. Contrast this with the preconstituted social rights held nonconditionally as positive social rights as adumbrated by Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty
148-60 (Princeton, NJ., 1980).
93. Simon, supra note 91, at 1516. See also Joel Handler, "'Constructing the Political
Spectacle': The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History," 56 Brook. L. Rev. 899 (1990).
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existing conceptions of property rather than expanding (let alone dislodging) them. Joining in the disillusionment with foundationalism and transformative and universalizing social theories, the "situated judgments"
offered by most progressives took hegemonic ideology for granted. Thus, the
successor to Reich in the age of Rorty, Margaret Jane Radin, has specifically
stated:
[The best strategy for making gains for the less well-off... [is] to drive
a wedge in the ideological justification of property by showing that
only a very small portion of private property rights serve the purposes
claimed for property in general, rather than attempting to disrupt the
ideology. of property. .

.

. [I] do not think

. . .

that the ideology of

property can be dislodged. [fn.: Indeed, now that the Supreme Court
more clearly than ever is more sympathetic to property rights than individual liberty rights, we need to debate the pragmatic strategy of assimilating more rights into property.]94
Thus Radin was driven to seek our better angels in the immanent concepts
of "home" and "personhood"-which, when pushed, would dictate providing (largely undefined) essentials to all while also removing certain kinds of
property, "personhood property, '95 from the world of "fungible" commodi94. Margaret Jane Radin, "Lacking a Transformative Social Theory," 45 Stan. L. Rev.
409 (1993) (reply to Stephen Schnably's universalist-transformative critique of Radin oeuvre
in "Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood," 45
Stan. L. Rev. 347 (1993)). Radin's oeuvre over the past decade has been both large and
influential: see esp. "Property and Personhood," 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 986 (1982) ("The more
closely connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement" to protection of the property interest); "Market Inalienability," 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1915 (1987) ("we are situated
in a nonideal world of ignorance, greed, and violence; of poverty, racism, and sexism. In spite
of our ideals, justice under nonideal circumstances, pragmatic justice, consists in choosing the
best alternative now available to us"); "The Pragmatist and the Feminist," 63 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1699 (1990). Schnably, at nn. 13-15, documents Radin's influence.
Courts and scholars alike have adopted the distinction between personal and fungible
property in discussing homelessness, condominium conversion, and job losses through plant
closings. The commodification/market inalienability distinction has been applied in discussions of surrogacy, prostitution, organ sales, celebrity, and housework. Still, Schnably's and
Simon's critiques seem apt: To the extent that it does, this strategy "succeeds only by virtue of
the homage it pays to the order it seeks to change." Simon, supra note 91, at 1432 (emphasis
added).
95. In the Continental tradition, "personhood" functions as a leading defense of private
property and makes it unassailable. Thus Hegel:
Since my will, as the will of a person, and so as a single will, becomes objective to me as
property, property acquires the character of private property ...In property my will is
the will of a person; but a person is a unit and so property becomes the personality of this
unitary will. Since property is the means whereby I give my will an embodiment, property must also have the character of being "this" or "mine." This is the important doctrine of the necessity of private property.
G. F. W. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 5[ 46 and Addition (T.Knox ed., London, 1967). In a
singular Americanization of Hegel, Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property 377 (Oxford,
1988), has argued that, since property ownership is essential to all for the development of
human personality, government, contrary to Madison, must assure that all Americans get
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ties where the market would continue to reign. Even more assertive versions
of such argument have floundered, despite their logical clarity and force. 96

All this is not to say that Reconstruction/New Deal claims to citizenship rights have succeeded by finding other means where expanding the conception of property has failed. No case makes this clearer, and arguably no
case points to the rejection of positive citizenship rights more clearly, than
San Antonio Ind. School Districtv. Rodriguez, a case decided in the year that
marked the onset of America's current economic decline. 97 There the
Supreme Court held, in effect, that education is not a fundamental right
and that wealth or poverty (i.e., class) is not a category suspect as a possible
mask for illegal discrimination. On this occasion, the winning and losing
Justices made their positions very clear. The dissenters provided one of the
clearest statements on record as to how, constitutionally speaking, one
might get from formal-negative to substantive-positive liberty, thereby escaping the property dependency of rights. It is, therefore, worth beginning
with what was rejected.
Justice Brennan summed up the "forward" position by attacking the
separation between legal, i.e., political, rights and the social, i.e., material,
rights necessary to make them real:
[We reject] the Court's rather distressing assertion that a right may be
deemed "fundamental" for the purposes of equal protection analysis
only if it is "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
As my Brother Marshall convincingly demonstrates, our prior cases
stand for the proposition that "fundamentality" is, in large measure, a
function of the right's importance in terms of the effectuation of those rights
which are in fact constitutionally guaranteed. (Emphasis added)
"Effectuation" is, of course, realization and transforms, for example, "freedom of speech and of the press" into a "right to read," literacy. 98 Such a
some. Thus, Waldron takes Hegel's potentially very conservative argument defending ownership and (as others have done with Hegel) radicalizes it.
96. Waldron, supra note 95. See also Edwin Baker, "Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty," 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1986) (disaggregating and differentially
underpinning the use value, welfare, personhood, protection and allocation functions of property). Baker concludes that if "liberty" is to have more than formal meaning, then the welfare
and personhood functions of property must be more fully developed, particularly so that access
to and control over meaningful work can be guaranteed. Thus, the possibility of laboring
indirectly becomes a prerequisite for its own theory of value.
97. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Formally at issue were massive interdistrict disparities in school
funding and per-pupil expenditure resulting from Texas's reliance on local property taxes. The
district court had invalidated the taxing and allocation schemes, which included a maximum
permissible tax rate. Footnotes and citations are omitted here from all excerpts of the opinion.
98. To my knowledge, only the American Library Association has explicitly asserted
that a free press inherently requires the right to literacy. A similar inference could be drawn
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transformation is conceptually inconsistent with the structure of our negative rights system. But it is conceivable as a positive rights conceptionrecognized, for example in T. H. Green's definition of liberty as "the positive
power or capacity of doing or enjoying something" 99-and has been treated
as such a programmatic right in (West) Germany, for example.
Justice Marshall's lead dissent generally preferred to coax the same result out of a consideration of the constitutional "importance of the interests
at stake" and the invidiousness of the classification applied in the legislation
involved. As with procreation, the state franchise, and criminal appeals,
as the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the
nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest
becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied
when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly .... Only if we closely protect the related interests
...do we ultimately insure the integrity of the constitutional guarantee itself.
Education "directly affects the ability of a child to exercise his First Amendment" rights-even if "this Court has never deemed the provision of free
public education to be required by the Constitution."'10 0 A "nexus" between
formal and substantive rights, negative and positive liberties is not quite a
direct bridge, but it does welcome crossing.
In raising the issue of "group wealth," i.e., class, as a suspect category,
Marshall sought to circumvent the Court's (and larger society's) position
that individual poverty, besides being natural, could be escaped from and
was, therefore, not a permanent category, like race, gender, legitimacy, etc.
Even if individual economic circumstances could change and often did (as
from C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech, passim (1989). Cass Sunstein,
"Beyond the Republican Revival," 97 Yale L.J. 1539, 1578 (1988), also hints at this problem
in the context of money, the press, and campaign financing. See also Owen Fiss, "Free Speech
and Social Structure," 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 1410, 1412 (1986).
Michael Walzer has maintained: "When we recognize 'the right of the citizens peacefully
to assemble,' for example, we are hoping for assemblies of citizens." Walzer, "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism," 18 Pol. Theory 6, 19 (1990). It is not clear, however, that the
right of free speech or of assembly creates speech or assembly. We may "hope" or take it for
granted, but that is not enough. At a certain stage in his life, John Dewey saw why American
society was undermining citizen competence; see The Public and Its Problems (Denver, Col.,
1927).
99. T. H. Green, "Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract," in 3 Works 371 (3d ed.
London, 1891).
100. San Antonio Ind. School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 111-12 (1973). Marshall was, it seems to me, by far the most European/social democratic of postwar Supreme
Court Justices. Cf. Jonathan Weinberg, "Thurgood Marshall and the Administrative State,"
38 Wayne L. Rev. 115 (1991), and the "Symposium Honoring Justice Thurgood Marshall," 80
Geo. LJ. 2003 (1992).
For a comprehensive and perspicacious argument as to how and why it should be, see
Susan Bitensky, "Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education under the U.S. Constitution," 86 Nw. U.L. Rev. 550 (1992).
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liberal social theory demands), class and class structure remained. Social
and state action could and sometimes did constitute and valorize class structure. From such a perspective, the critical liberal distinction between state
and society, public and private, looks shaky. Thus, class too could be treated
as a form of or fruit of state discrimination or ratification (which liberal
theory prohibits).
[Giroup wealth discrimination involves wealth over which the disadvantaged individual has no significant control, it represents in fact a
more serious basis of discrimination than does personal wealth ...
[W]e have previously treated discrimination on a basis which the individual cannot control as constitutionally disfavored .... [Further, this

case is] unusual in the extent to which governmental action is the
cause of the wealth classifications.
The consequential logic of Reconstruction and the New Deal impulses
was clear. Call it "substantive equal protection," as many of the constitutional law casebooks do, or whatever, from such a perspective political democracy cannot be realized without social democracy. Such, perhaps, is not
to be in this country. And, assuredly, its arrival would not be heralded by
the Court and its Constitution. As Justice Stewarts concurrence made
clear: "[the dissent] would mark an extraordinary departure from principled
[equal protection] adjudication." Simply, "the Equal Protection Clause confers no substantive rights and creates no substantive liberties. [Its] function,
rather, is simply to measure the validity of classifications created by state
laws."1o1 Neither the rich nor the poor may presume the right to sleep under
bridges; it is, however, for the court to determine if allowing one group but
not another to do so is a violation of equal protection rights.
Justice Powell's opinion of the Court found neither impingement of a
fundamental right nor the disadvantaging of a suspect class. 10 2 After all,

"the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property
districts"; there was no "absolute deprivation of the desired benefit," only
relative; and, anyway, contrary to what the district court had believed, it is
"a disputed question whether the quality of education may be determined by
the amount of money expended for it." Education may indeed be as impor101. 411 U.S. 1, 59. See Rawls, supra note 3, at 5: Institutions are just when, in asmake no arbitrary distinctions among persons.

signing basic rights, they

Thus too, the later companion case of Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), is about
voiding a discriminatory classification. Together the two cases underscore that inequality of
property is a private issue while government withholding of benefits from an entire class of
people is a public issue. The majority Justices in effect rejected the proposition cautiously
offered by Michelman a scant four years earlier that a "limited assimilation of impecuniousness to membership in a racial, ethnic, or national minority is not lacking in plausibility."
Michelman, "Foreword," supra note 25, at 20.
102. Hence, the only question that needed to be put to the Texas law in question was
whether it served some legitimate, articulated state purpose, i.e., minimal scrutiny.

31

32

LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY

tant for the enjoyment of First Amendment rights and liberties, for voting
and citizenship as the "effectuation" and "nexus" theories insist. But:
[We have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority
to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice....
[Tihe logical limitations on... the nexus theory are difficult to
perceive. How, for instance, is education to be distinguished from...
the basics of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination might
well [confirm] that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the
most ineffective participants in the political process and that they enjoy the least enjoyment from the benefits of the First Amendment.
Within the logic of American legal-political discourse, such dilemmas lie
outside the law.

V. A COMPARATIVE ASIDE: THE GERMAN DUALITY
There are at least two reasons for considering the supplementation of
our prevailing property-based negative rights regime with citizenship-based
positive rights. The first is that negative rights, "liberties," provide people
possibilities that in our existing socioeconomic system they are unable to
fulfill meaningfully. Freedom from censorship, for example, is a valuable
negative liberty, which, however, does little if anything to foster literacy.
The second reason has to do with the immense and growing inequality
in the ownership of productive property. Notwithstanding the legal renovations and additions of Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Civil Rights
eras of equal protection and fundamental rights jurisprudence, inequality in
productive property ownership has continued to grow, and continues to impede the nation's democratic promise. As discussed supra, "new property"
has proven to be no substitute for "old property," and consequently a democratic society might be better off uncoupling rights from property and
grounding them is something more universal and democratic, like citizenship. To a certain extent, some European legal systems have moved in this
direction over the past half-century.
Juxtaposed to America's Lockean constitutional conception of persons
who are individualistic, self-regarding, and unencumbered, Germany offers
a constitutionalism more deeply implicating community and duty and
rooted in a history that has included significant feudal and socialist impulses. 10 3 The current German Constitution ("Basic Law," Grundgesetz) was
103. See Franz Neumann, The Rule of Law 179-285 (Dover, N.H., 1986); David Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic 1-41 (2d ed. New York, 1986). This feudal and
socialist background is reflected in the duties which the German constitution connects to the
ownership of property and the state's right to socialize landed and industrial property for the
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adopted in 1949: in the wake of defeated Nazism, in an atmosphere of popular-front reformism, in the midst of a then still-unresolved American-capitalist/Soviet-communist competition for German hearts and minds, and
under the watchful eyes of both Anglo-Saxon and Gallic critics. (West)
German society benefited greatly from this particular conjuncture, and its
Constitution writers were able to join the most serviceable elements of their
1°4
own traditions with those of the negative liberty traditions.
Whereas the centrality and strength of our negative liberties testify to
our acute distrust of state power, the current German constitution (like
some of its predecessors) underscores the social connections and commitments of individual citizens. As one German constitutional specialist has
put it,
One [the American] vision is partial to the city perceived as a private
realm in which the individual is alone, isolated, and in competition
with his fellows, while the other [current German] vision is partial to
the city perceived as a public realm where individual and community
are bound together in some degree of reciprocity. Thus, the authority
of the community, as represented by the state, finds a more congenial
abode in German than American constitutionalism.oS
This different constitutional concept may be applied to the barrier encountered by the dissenters in San Antonio Ind. School District v. Rodriguez.
The existence of a "nexus" (Marshall) or "effectuation" requirement (Brennan) is recognized in several ways in the positive-liberty, welfare-state mandate of the Basic Law. To take the free press/literacy case, for example, a
positive "value" accompanies the negative "right." Thus, in the German
schema:
A basic "right" is a negative right against the state, but this right also
represents a "value," and as a value it imposes an obligation on the
state to insure that it becomes an integral part of the general legal
order. [For exampleI the right to freedom of the press protects a newspaper against any [encroachment] of the state . . . but as an objective
value applicable to society as a whole, the state is duty-bound to create
the conditions that make freedom of the press both possible and
effective.106
sake of the commonweal. Article 14(2) of the Grundgesetz states simply: "Property imposes
duties. Its use should also serve the public weal."
104. Weimar Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs, arts. 119, 143, 145, 161, 163 (enumerating rights to education, national insurance, and employment or unemployment
compensation).

105. Donald Kommers, "German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon," 40 Emory LJ.
837, 867 (1991) (emphasis added).

106. Id.at 859 & n.63. To be sure, within this example, it is not entirely certain that
free speech and free press rights through their corresponding values mandate the provision or
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Among the arguments Germans use in favor of state obligations are exactly
those that, as we have seen, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected: first, contra Justice Powell, they argue that effectuationlike values are required precisely "to facilitate political participation and
representative government"; and, second, contra Justice Stewart, they argue
that the Basic Law's welfare-state perspective "requires the state inter alia to
provide subsidies to persons and groups who would not otherwise be able to
exercise their rights effectively."
Thus, German legal ideology, like that of other welfare states less committed to public/private, state/society distinctions, contains a strain that
tends to direct governments "to compensate for inequalities of wealth for
which it was not responsible."'1 7 In the overlapping area of campaign financing and free speech, for example, the leading American cases are mired
in the free speech/marketplace of ideas discourse: in the marketplace,
money, however much one has of it, talks. In contrast, the (West) German
constitutional court has invalidated the tax deductibility of campaign contributions on the grounds that they benefited wealthy taxpayers more than
others and hence worked to the advantage of the more conservative
parties.108

As another German constitutional scholar and Justice of the German
Federal Constitutional Court has put it, "The particular liberty enshrined in
the basic right is qualified in a special way by relating all basic rights to
values. As a result of this value dimension it is aimed at realizing and fulfilling the value expressed in and through such rights."' °9 Crowning this hierarchy of values is something the German jurists regularly call "the principle
of human dignity." This principle requires rejection of both legal positivism
guarantee of some measure of literacy. See E.-W. B6chenf~rde, State, Society, and Liberty
175-98 (New York, 1991).
107. David Currie, "Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights," 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1
864, 883 (1986). See also id., "Lochner Abroad: Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany," 11 Sup. Ct. Rev. 333 (1993).
108. The two leading German cases are Party Tax Deduction Cases, 8 BVerGE (1958),
and Party Finance Case, 20 BVerGE 56 (1966). In the not-unrelated area of television broadcasting, the German high court has held that the state must "ensure" that the diversity of
existing opinions finds its greatest possible breadth and completeness through broadcasting.
The Third Televison [Network], 57 BVerGE 295 (1989). Cf. the American situation, Stephen Gardbaum, "Broadcasting, Democracy and the Market," 82 Geo. LJ. 373 (1993).
The leading American cases are Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (limitations on
independent political expenditures struck down as limiting free speech); First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (same, in context of public referendum); Central
Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 537 (1980) (regulated public utility may
advertise to promote usage even as state encourages conservation). See also Miami Herald
Publishing v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (states may not compel newspapers to offer a
right of reply); Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973) (antiwar campaign advertising need not be accepted for airing); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (as private entities, shopping centers may exclude leafletters and
speakers).
109. B6chenf6rde, supra note 106, at 190-91.
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and moral relativism-the very hallmarks of our own system of negative
rights. One former President (Chief Justice) of the German Court has gone
so far as to say that the guiding values of the German Basic Law are "equality, social justice, the welfare state, the rule of law, and militant democracy."110 It is difficult to imagine such testimony at an American Supreme
Court nomination hearing.
Because the German constitutional system explicitly recognizes positive as well as negative rights, it can commit the state to the effectuation or
realization of guaranteed liberties. Hence, in addition to negative liberties
similar to our own and intended to protect individual freedom and autonomy vis-a-vis the state or other individuals, through its welfare-state Sozialstaat ("social state") commitment, the German constitution is committed
programmatically to positive rights. A positive right, as Berlin also understood it,"' represents a claim that the individual may make on the state. As
Kommers puts it,
In the German understanding positive rights embrace not only a right
also a right to effective realization of personal
to certain social needs but
2
rights and autonomy.1l
Limited by the overarching, if somewhat abstract, requirement of deference to human dignity and the common good, positive rights constitute and
generate entitlements that individual citizens may claim from the state. As
Kommers sums it up-rather too innocently:
[A]n individual... may need the state's help to enjoy a basic right
effectively such as, for example, equality. In this respect the notion of a
right under the Basic Law is broader than the concept of a right under
the United States Constitution. A right in the German constitutionalist view is not only the right to be left alone, free of state interference,
right to some form of state assistance in the enjoyment of the
but the
11 3
right.

110. Wolfgang Zeidler, "Grundrechte und Grundenrscheidungen der Verfassung im
Widerstreit" 53 Deutschen Juristentages 1980 at 4; Kommers, supra note 105, at 861. Even
German law is double-edged, of course, and so it should be noted that this paramount "principle of human dignity," particularly in the aftermath of Nazi eugenics, was cited in 1975 to
strike down a liberalized abortion statute; 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975). See Joachim Perels, Grundrechte als Fundamentder Demokratie 11, 40 (Frankfurt, 1979).
111. See Berlin, supra note 28. Alan Ryan, Property and Political Theory (New York,
1984); id., Property (Milton Keynes, 1987); id., ed., The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honor of
IsaiahBerlin (New York, 1979), esp. the essay by Charles Taylor, "What's Wrong with Negative Liberty" at 175-93. America has simply not scaled the (Isaiah) Berlin Wall.
112. Kommers, supra note 105, at 861.
113. Id. at 862.
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Needless to say, even under this sort of mixed capitalist-democracy regime,
the degree of assistance people receive from the state to effectuate their
rights is a matter of legislative, programmatic discretion and is not set constitutionally, as it occasionally was in the former state socialist countries of
eastern Europe.114 Even so, for those who care about democracy and the
welfare state, it is worth seeing and imagining a "discursive terrain" or "field
of struggle" broadly different from America's.
Article 20(1) of the 1949 Basic Law describes the Federal Republic as a
federal, democratic, and social state. This social commitment or Sozialstaatlichkeit adds to the formal, procedural equality of Rechtstaatlichkeit shared
with the American constitutional conception: in other words, justice is
commanded along with fairness.' 15 Equality transcends its purely formal
meaning because, unlike in the United States, it is linked to the dual principles of human dignity and the social welfare state. In addition, the privileging of political parties affords individuals (as well as, obviously, interest
groups) the opportunity to aggregate their interests along shared ideological
and organizational lines, thereby somewhat mitigating disparities of income
11 6
and wealth.
Inevitably too, the language of duties-also underdeveloped in American law"17-joins the language of negative and positive rights. With that
114. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, "Rights in Twentieth Century Constitutions," 59 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 519 (1992). Besides the vague German "social state" commitment, one finds in
the welfare capitalist democracies of western Europe "programmatic" (not individually enforceable) constitutional statements like the Swedish:
The personal, economic and cultural welfare of the individual shall be fundamental aims
of the activities of the community. In particular, it shall be incumbent on the community
to secure the right to work, to housing and to education and to promote social care and
security as well as a favorable living environment.
"The Basic Principles of the Constitution" in Swedish Instrument of Government, quoted in id.,
"Rights and Responsibilities Viewed from Afar," 4 Responsive Community 33, 37 (1994).
115. Of course, American and German legal systems do belong to the same larger "European" legal culture. As Franz Wieacker has put it:
The same tension between property rights and contractual autonomy on the one hand,
and the social restrictions on private rights and their exercise on the other is apparent in
the private law of modem economic societies. Today, the resulting antinomy between
liberal and social Rechtstaat poses one of the fundamental constitutional problems....
But this tension only confirms the extent to which individual freedom and social duty
(to use catchwords: individualism and socialism) are two sides of the same coin: a specifically Western personalism.
"Foundations of European Legal Culture", 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 22-23 (1990).
116. The virtues and vices of the so-called Parteienstaathave been much debated. For
introductions and summaries, see Michaela Richter, "The Basic Law and the Democratic
Party State: Constitutional Theory and Political Practice," in Detlef Junker et al., eds., Cornerstone of Democracy: The West German Grundgesetz 1949-89 at 37 (New York, 1995). But
see Claus Offe & Helmut Wiesenthal, "Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes
on Social Class and Organizational Form," 1 Pol. Power & Soc. Theory 67 (1980) (asymmetry
of politics and markets as respective arenas in which citizens and big business interests organize to achieve core demands).
117. See, e.g., Steven Heyman, "Foundations of the Duty to Rescue," 47 Vand. L. Rev.
674 (1994) (seeking to establish bases for rescue and other duties).
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joinder, communitarian relations and pressures join the property-based contractarianismthat prevails in our system. A number of West European countries have constitutionalized an individual's duties to others. The 1947
Italian Constitution, for example, imposes on citizens "the performance of
unalterable duties of a political, economic, and social nature"; directs that
citizens undertake "an activity or a function contributing to the material
and moral progress of society"; and enumerates specific duties, including the
support and education of one's children, and the duty to vote. The postFranco Spanish Constitution of 1978 speaks of "The Rights and Duties of
Citizens" and specifies, inter alia, the duty to work, the duty to support one's
children, the duty to defend the country, and a duty to create "an environ8
ment suitable to the development of the person.""
Real autonomy, real individual freedom, is seen as requiring much
more than the ultimate, market-based American virtue: choice.' 9 Our own
emphasis on individual autonomy-choice-makes collective action,
whether as a family, a neighborhood, or a trade union, much more difficult
than in Europe. We fear, disdain, and avoid the dependency (and not just
interdependency) that is necessarily intertwined with collective action. To
stop with negative liberty, to rest content with resource-based choice by
atomistic individuals is, in the German and other social-democratic regimes,
however, to misunderstand and underestimate personhood. 120 The German
Supreme Court has explicitly held:

118. Italian Constitution arts. 4, 30, 48; Spanish Constitution arts. 2, 30, 35, 39, 45
(trans. in A. Blaustein & G. Flanz, eds., Constitutionsof the Countries of the World 47-49 (New
York, 1991)).
119. Roe v. Wade, probably faute de mieux, represents the apotheosis of "choice." Indeed,
defense of the principle enunciated there has become the "pro-choice" movement. Of course,
in real, material terms there is generally little "free" about the abortion choice. And Roe itself
posits autonomous, isolated women, alone and unattached to family or community (except
insofar as family and community might impinge on the autonomy and free choice of the
woman involved). There are no values that might transcend the woman's present interests
because her interest is presumed to be private, self-realization.
On the (mis-)uses of "choice" to undervalue constraint in several areas of American law
and policy, see Martha Minow, "Choice and Constraints: For Justice Thurgood Marshall," 80
Geo. J. 2093 (1992).
120. This social-democratic communitarian position goes at least as far back as Marx.
[T]he so-called rights of man... are simply the rights... of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community....
None of the supposed rights of man, therefore, go beyond egoistic man, man as he is
as a member of civil society; that is an individual separated from the community, withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied with his private interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice. . . . [S]pecies-life itself-society-appears as a system
which is external to the individul and as a limitation of his original independence. The
only bond between men is natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation
of their property and their egoistic persons.
"On the Jewish Question," in Tom Bottomore, ed., Karl Marx: Early Writings 24-26 (New

York, 1964).
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The concept of man in the Basic Law [Constitution] is not that of an
isolated, sovereign individual; rather, the Basic Law has decided in
favor of a relationship between individual and community in the sense
of a person's dependence on the commitment to the121community, without infringement upon a person's individual value.
Thus, in at least some respects, society is prior to the individual and
has legitimate claims over him. The relationship between self and society is
constitutive, not merely instrumental. Public and private, state and society,
are (for better or worse) far less bifurcated than in our own system. Such a
view necessarily rejects radical individualism, with its own attendant rejection of duties-an individualism that characterizes not only ACLU-style
liberals but also liberal free marketeers as well as postmodem radicalism,
whose non-Heideggerian forms are themselves in fact but forms of
hyperliberalism.
Needless to say, a system like the German has difficulties with subcommunities or multiculturalism. It is not an accident, in fact, that the most
successful welfare states have been established in countries of great ethnic
homogeneity. Further, it cannot be gainsaid that the constitutionalization of
values, communities, and duties, as in German articles 1, 2, 9 II, 18, 20, 21
II, and 28 can put undesirable minorities at risk and that social solidarity
can induce a conformity that offends the libertarian impulse.
VI.

HITTING THE (BERLIN) WALL: THE POWER
AND LIMITS OF NEGATIVITY

Are private, social inequalities beyond the realm of constitutional public law? Does the Fourteenth Amendment intend, make necessary, or leave
open the possibility for socialism? That is surely an impossible (and now
perhaps even irrelevant) question. 122 Certainly Lincoln and even the radicals were "bourgeois" rather than "socialist" heroes even by the standards of
the time. What is clear, however, is that Reconstruction radicals, like the
later thoroughgoing New Dealers, began to inch toward a positive conception of liberty and legal protection. That positive conception was built on
121. BVerfGE 7, 15-16 (1954), cited in Kommers, supra note 105, at 873.
122. It is, however, beyond dispute that the framers of the 14th Amendment did intend
to weaken state and local government to the advantage of the national state. This alone
would cast- some doubt on Justice Powell's assertion in San Antonio Ind. School District v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, at 54, that:
if local taxation [were] an unconstitutional method of providing for education, then it
might be an equally impermissible means [for] . . . police and fire protection, public
health and hospitals, and public utilities .... We perceive no justification for such a
severe denigration of local property taxation and control.
On the more general question, see Morton Keller, Affairs of State: Public Life in Late 19th
Century America (Cambridge, Mass., 1977).
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an expanded concept of state capacity and a realization that property-based,
contract images of equality were deficient and even oppressive. The opposition between "politics and markets" was already laid bare. The marketplace
was not the model of justice, citizen efficacy, or communication. Politics
was called upon to help: hence the New Deal call to move the capital from
Wall Street to Washington. Hence, too, the New Deal's need for democratic mass mobilization, even if some of these mobilizations threatened to
go further than political leaders wished or needed.
**

*

The same ambiguity and vacillation that stultified the New Deal marks

America today. Both the advances scored and the defeats inflicted during
the due process/equal protection/fundamental rights struggles of the last decades mirror the concept of liberty those struggles articulated. Just as importantly, they also bespeak and were, for the most part, trapped and limited by
the negative conception of liberty they haltingly began to transcend-but
could not finally escape. This negative conception is underscored by the
continued viability and tenacity of property "as the quintessential symbol
for all rights and liberties,"'123 despite the fact that most of the other rights
arguably protected by it now enjoy more direct constitutional protection.
The essential negativity of the American regime has been boldly (and
repeatedly) stated by the conservative majority of the Supreme Court. Chief
Justice Rehnquist provided a particularly-but not uniquely-piquant formulation in Deshaney v. Winnebago County, where he wrote that the essence
and function of the Constitution is "to protect the people from the State,
not to ensure that the State protect[s] them from each other." More specifically, due process is a "limitation on the State's power to act, not

. . .

a

guarantee of certain minimum levels of safety and security." 124 It is difficult
to imagine a less communitarian vision or one more averse to the establishment of social citizenship rights. 125 It appears that only negative liberties
123. Carol Rose, book review, 10 Coast. Comm. 238, 244-45 (1993) (reviewing James
Ely, The Guardianof Every Other Right: A ConstitutionalHistory of Property Rights (New York,
1992)). See also Carol Rose, "Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety," Nomos XXXIII
(1991), at 223.
124. 489 U.S. 189, 196, 195 (1989) (inaction by social worker led to death of child at
the hands of known abusive father).
Much the same point was made by Judge-scholar Posner in a case similar to DeShaney:
mhe Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.... The men
who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for
the people but that it might do too much to them.... [TIhe difference between harming
and failing to help is just the difference... between negative liberty-being let alone by
the state-and positive liberty-being helped by the state.
Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1202, 1204 (7th Cir. 1983).
125. Rand Rosenblatt has astutely formulated how the Deshaney opinion undermines the
grounding for even a minimalist conception of the welfare state:
[T]he social worker's inaction did not "cause" [the boy's] injuries, because it did not
increase the risk of harm beyond what it would have been had the state never established
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exist as rights, whereas affirmative or positive entitlements (or whatever we
might call them) exist only as discretionary or revocable privileges.
To be sure, professions of state neutrality in the face of inevitable social
conflict are sometimes merely partisan evocations rather than "deep ideology. 1 26 Yet the essence of our "equal protection" doctrine-the neutrality
of the state and the negativity of the rights guaranteed by the constitution-remains a powerful ideological beacon and material force. It is the
Constitution "on its own terms."1 27 As one astute observer has put it, in this
system focused on non- or antidiscrimination, "equal protection rights are
not only individualized, but also universalized," and "no person seems to be
'2
given more protection than another." s
a child protection agency at all. In other words, the state's "right" not to have any child
protection agency at all must include the "lesser" right to have one that provides grossly
inadequate protection.
Further,
We are told that the Framers... clearly assigned the question of whether to recognize
affirmative rights to the political process, and not to the courts. To question the distinction between negative and affirmative rights is to attack the authority of the "people of
Wisconsin," their actual views on the matter being irrelevant to the federal constitutional issue.
Rosenblatt, "Social Duties and the Problem of Rights in the American Welfare State," in D.
Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law 90, 98-99 (New York, 1990).
126. To cite but three of many recent examples: In 1980 the Supreme Court upheld the
Hyde Amendment barring federal funding of abortion through Medicaid on the grounds that
"an indigent woman [is left] with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to
obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all." Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980). Rosenblatt,
supra note 125, further cites Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 108 S.Ct. 1184 (1988), in
which Congress could withdraw food stamp eligibility from workers on strike because such
action is not state coercion of workers applied to their right to strike, but only "declin[ing] to
extend ... assistance" in the name of state "neutrality" in social conflicts. Analogously, as
Rosenblatt captures it, in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 108 S.Ct. 2481 (1988): "a
school district's refusal to waive a bus transportation charge for a low-income child living
sixteen miles from school is constitutional, because the Constitution does not require bus
service to be offered at all, and hence imposes no obligation to offer it for free." Only if there
were suspect government discrimination against some (based on race, legitimacy, etc., but not
wealth) would it be otherwise.
Cases like these strain one's belief in what used to be called the relative autonomy of
ideological structures. Obviously these measures are meant to make citizens forsake certain
recognized rights.
127. Bandes, supra note 25, at 2309, argues as follows:
the conventional wisdom about negative and affirmative rights presents itself as a neutral
and inexorable, rather than as a particular way of thinking, shaped by particular influences, it is instead an amalgam of vestigial common law notions, individualistic political
philosophy, originalist constitutional theory, and fear of the slippery slope.... [It] makes
little attempt to understand the Constitution on its own terms.
Although Bandes is obviously correct that it is in the language of these influences that the
Court expresses itself, there is no reason to believe that the conventional wisdom fails "to
understand the Constitution on its own terms." The indeterminacy and political conditioning
seems obvious.
128. Owen Fiss, "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause," 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 128
(1976). For a more detailed discussion of this point, see David Abraham, "Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law: Union Membership Resignations and
Strikebreaking in the New Economy," 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1268, 1283-90 (1988).
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Choice and other norms originating in and convivial to the market
flourish under this logic, which aids powerfully in the reproduction of existing social arrangements, facilitating neglect of and even war on the weak,
whose freedom to choose might actually be chimerical. 129 For our law, there
exists a pre-political and pre-legal (one is tempted to say "natural") world,
which the state observes but does not significantly help reproduce and into
which the courts intervene only to assure that there has been no suspect
form of discrimination or unwarranted deprivation of liberty by the state
itself. 130 In the abstract, or as Marx once put it, "in imagination, individuals
seem freer" in this sort of world, "because their conditions of life seem accidental" rather than ascribed; "in reality, of course, they are less free, because
they are more subjected to the violence of things." 131
Justice William Brennan, who along with Justice Thurgood Marshall
was the Justice most associated with the duration of the due process/equal
protection/fundamental rights struggles of the Warren Court era, has acknowledged this limitation. He has spoken of the limitation and the need to
do better with urgency and moral passion. Speaking to lawyers and legal
scholars, Brennan has exhorted his colleagues to recognize that:
[Wie as lawyers know the difference between formal and real equality,
and must therefore lead the fight to close the gap between the two....
Real equality will cost us something. For example, are we willing to pay
the substantially higher taxes necessary to make up for past legal deprivations and to create a truly just and equitable society? Are we willing
to permit public housing or rent subsidy in our neighborhoods? Are we
willing to let our sons bear the same risk in time of war as the sons of
the poor and deprived bear? If not, all our good works in legal assistance programs ... and the like are meaningless
tinkerings which do
132
little more than salve our own consciences.
129. See Minow, supra note 119, at 2105-7. It was, of course, quite apt that free-market
economist Milt, n Friedman's TV series was entitled Free to Choose (P.B.S. television broadcast, 11 Jan. 1987). More recently, "choice" has been a weapon in the war on the weak in the
arena of the schools:
Allowing parents to choose their children's schools may be the hottest idea in American
education, but a new flood of research argues that such "choice" programs alone will not
help schools.... choice primarily benefits children of better-educated parents, does not
necessarily improve student performance, requires additional money and... may actually
widen the gap between rich and poor school districts.
N.Y. Times, 26 Oct. 1992, at Al. See James Liebman, "Voice, Not Choice," 101 Yale L.J. 259
(1991) (book review).
130. Rarely will the state acknowledge that it has had a hand in creating the natural
social world it observes. The "public"/"private" distinction and the "state action" doctrine are
among the least coherent precincts of American law. See, e.g., Lawrence Tribe, Constitutonal
Choices 246-66 (Cambridge, Mass., 1985); id., "The Curvature of Constitutional Space," 103
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1989).
131. Karl Marx, The German Ideology 77 (R. Pascal ed. New York, 1947).
132. William Brennan, Jr., "Are Citizens Justified in Being Suspicious of the Law and
the Legal System?" 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 981, 986 (1989).
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Even as he seeks to transcend the universe of formal and negative rights,
Brennan, in his uneasy oscillation between juridical-legal rights and political-legislative policies, cannot transcend it. In the American system there
is actually no principled reason why lawyers should be more attentive to
"the difference between formal and real equality" than anyone else.
Indeed, even in his own discussion of the "effectuation" of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights in San Antonio Ind. School District v.
Rodriguez and elsewhere, Brennan found himself limited by something more
than the "extremely restrictive value choices about the role of government"
33
highlighted by one commentator. Somewhere he felt "inherent limits.'
The requisites of the Constitution may require affirmative efforts by the government, but constitutionalizing them as rights was not where Brennan
asked his audience to go.
Another thoughtful and respectful commentator has taken Brennan's
words and attempted to lift them out over the Hartzian perimeter by restating Brennan's call as a matter of rights.
Justice Brennan laid the failure of the "New Deal" and subsequent
"Wars on Poverty" to the conceptual inability to extend programs providing access to social resources, and to social and political participation, into legal recognitions in the form of rights guaranteeing human
dignity.134

But the necessary consequence, in our own system, would be a conflation of
legal and political, judicial and legislative functions, if not indeed of public
and private-something our ideological regime viscerally rejects. 135 Hence
too, Brennan is taken beyond himself and understood to be saying that:
Eradication of poverty, real equality of resources-in short, distribution-was thought to be the domain of legislation, and not to be independently a part of purely legal justice. The failure of the New Deal
substantially to change American society and to assure greater equality

133. Bandes, supra note 25, at 2342. Even while attacking the Court's use of the public!
private distinction, Bandes is compelled to grant that "the scope of governmental obligation is
[not] without inherent limits." Id. at 2343. Moses could get water from a rock; anyone operating without special help is better off trying a well. Cf. Seth Kreimer, "Allocational Sanctions:
The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State," 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293 (1984), and
Michelman's now classic "Foreword," supra note 25.
134. Kenneth Casebeer, "Running on Empty: Justice Brennan's Plea, the Empty State,
the City of Richmond, and the Profession," 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 989, 992 (1989). "Human
dignity" is the value underlying German constitutionalism; see supra at 38.
135. Neumann, sources cited supra note 22; Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism
76-93 (London, 1978); Hale, supra note 22. On the possible aggrandizement of the judicial
role, see Michelman, supra note 25.
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lay in the intentional segregation of law, as adjudication
of rights, from
136
politics, as legislation of distributive policies.

Indeed.
If anything, Thurgood Marshall was more collectivist than his radical
liberal Brother Brennan. 37 Yet he too understood the Constitution to create a "right of every American to an equal start in life."' 38 On this reading,
Marshall was committed to equality of opportunity and the rejection of caste
and its consequences. Indeed, to the extent that the Reconstruction amendments, especially the Fourteenth, were about the abolition of caste legislation, Marshall's efforts were intended to carry out Reconstruction. As one
astute mainstream observer has put it,

Marshall was not an egalitarian. His conception of equality was extremely old-fashioned.... [That conception involved, as its defining
feature, a commitment to equality of opportunity. In Marshall's constitutional vision, this commitment
entailed, first and foremost, a right to
39
equal prospects in education.1

By "genuine equality," Marshall did not mean equality of result. His goal
was to end caste-the meaning of Jim Crow-in America. To most expert
observers, the thrust of Marshall's corpus is to oppose and end all caste systems: "understood as second-class citizenship, in which one group is systematically below others on the basis of a morally irrelevant factor such as race,
sex, or disability."'14 As argued above, the "nexus" of caste and class is such
that the gap between formal and substantive rights, negative and positive
liberties, begs to be bridged.
It may be that there was a more radical Thurgood Marshall who, under
more propitious circumstances, would have been ready and able to make the
effort. Or, as I think more likely, the power of legal and political strategies
forced to address individual rights violations always leads away from and
obscures structured collective inequalities.' 4' Some more pessimistic African
American legal scholars have even concluded that the civil rights move136. Casebeer, supra note 134, at 992. See Krouse & McPherson, "Capitalism, 'PropertyOwning Democracy,' and the Welfare State," in A. Gutmann, ed., Democracy and the Welfare
State 79-105 (Princeton, N.J., 1988); John Keane, Civil Society and the State (New York, 1988)
(social democratic welfare-state politics).
137. See Frank Michelman, "Super Liberal: Romance, Community and Tradition in
William J. Brennan's Constitutional Thought," 77 Va. L. Rev. 1261 (1991).
138. San Antonio Ind. School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
139. Cass Sunstein, "On Marshall's Conception of Equality," 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1267,
1270 (1992).
140. Id. See also Randall Kennedy, "Doing What You Can with What You Have: The
Greatness of Justice Marshall," 80 Geo. LJ. 2081 (1992).
141. For a good example of how this works in antidiscrmination law, see Kristin Bumiller, The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of Victims (Baltimore, 1988); Alan Free-
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ment has had no choice but to employ an entrenched discourse of liberal
rights in order to turn America's "institutional logic" against itself. The
price of transformation, however, has been the even greater legitimation of
material inequality, the "loss of collectivity among Blacks," and a reaffirmation of the prevailing ideology.142 It is, again, a limit of legal liberalism, of
struggle feasible within the hegemonic logic.143
Yet, the failure to grasp-or the unwillingness to confront-fully the
divide between negative right and affirmative obligation has been a recurrent problem for American progressives. Thus, in defense of his own position, Brennan harkens back to another great progressive jurist, Benjamin
Cardozo, who in the depths of the 1920s had written that "no contract [is]
worthy of respect unless the parties to it are in relations, not only of liberty,
but of equality." In language that mirrored Marx's original critique of
Hegel's theory of law and state, Cardozo expressed the belief that in any
contract, "[i]f one of the parties be without defense or resources, compelled
to comply with the demands of the other, the result is a suppression of true
freedom."144 Like Brennan and Marshall, Cardozo too was aware that liberty
needed to be viewed not merely "negatively or selfishly as a mere absence of
restraint, but positively and socially as an adjustment of restraints to the end
of freedom of opportunity."1 45 This awareness informed Cardozo's conception of the role of the judge but did not impress itself into American law.
VII.

CITIZENSHIP AND WELFARE: OR HOW TO
SCALE THE (ISAIAH) BERLIN WALL

But why freedom of opportunity? Why this classically liberal Lockean
formulation? Obviously the opportunity principle-the opportunity of individuals to express themselves through the development of personality, including bringing property under their control-is at war with the "real
equality of resources" principle that Justice Brennan postulated as necessary.
Thus, once again the negative, property-based conception of rights shortcircuits its critics' efforts to transcend it.
As C. B. Macpherson once pointed out, the property-based negative
conception of liberty cannot resolve its central contradiction; it can only
reinvent it. His formulation is worth a closer look:
man, "Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review," inKairys, supra note 125, at 96, and Fiss,
supra note 128.
142. Kimberl6 Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and Retrenchment," 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331,
1366, 1383 (1988).
143. See Morton Horwitz, "The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism," 14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 599 (1979).
144. Benjamin Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science 82 (New York, 1928).
145. Id. at 118.

Property and Rights: A "Negative" Citizenship Regime

The central problem of liberal-democratic theory may be stated as the
difficulty of reconciling the liberal property right with that equal effective right of all individuals to use and develop their capacities which is
the essential ethical principle of liberal democracy. .

.

. [WI]hen the

liberal property right is written into law as an individual right to the
exclusive use and disposal of resources provided by nature and of capital created by past work on them, and when it is combined with the
liberal system of market incentives and the rights of free contract, it
leads to and supports a concentration of ownership and a system of
power relations between individuals and classes which negates the ethical goal. .

.

. There thus seems to be an insoluble difficulty within

liberal democratic theory. If... an individual property right is required
by the very necessities of man's nature and condition, it ought not to
be infringed or denied. But unless it is seriously infringed or denied, it
leads to an effective denial of the equal possibility of individual human
fulfillment.146

This contradiction inheres in liberal property theory regardless of
which of the four most prevalent lines of justificatory argument one adopts:
labor and desert (Locke), utility and efficiency (Bentham), development of
human personality (Hegel), or justice and equality (Rousseau?).14 7 Nor does
philosophical "new liberalism" manage to resolve the classical contradiction
between liberalism's property right and its ethical commitment to self-fulfillment. To assert, as does Ronald Dworkin, for example, that modem liberalism, rather than being only about liberty, is also about equality,
including the individual right to be treated as an equal, is to declare the
battle won.1 48 It is a position that "new" or "social" liberals have advocated
in Europe since early in the century but whose successes have not been of
149
their own making.
As Macpherson rightly concluded in reaching and reaching beyond the
position Brennan expressed,
[The problem of liberal democratic theory is no longer a problem of
putting limits on the property right, but of supplementing the individual right to exclude others by the individual right not to be excluded
by others.... The right not to be excluded by 'others may... be stated
as the individual right to equal access to the means of labor and/or the
means of life.
146. C. B. Macpherson, Property: Mainstream and CriticalPositions 200 (Toronto, 1978).
147. See Lawrence Becker, "Too Much Property," 21 Philos. & Pub. Aff. 196, 198-99
(1992). As often as not, in particular cases these four principles will lead to conflicting
judgments.
148. Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism," in A Matter of Principle 127 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1986).
149. For some reasons why, see the classic work, Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets
162-65 (New York, 1977).
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Equal access. 150 Moving from equal opportunity to equal access to the accumulated productive resources of society compels transcending negativity
and providing for positive rights. How does one vault liberalism's Berlin
wall-or tear it down, or sneak around it? How can a society get to the
principal differences created by property and the negative conception of
liberty it requires?
At a more auspicious political conjuncture, Frank Michelman could
write of claiming "a legal right to have certain wants satisfied out of the
public treasury," a " 'minimum protection against economic hazard.' "51 For
the provision of at least certain goods, equal protection law could be marshaled because:
"equality" (the norm) consists of a compensatory assurance of access to
universally "needed" amounts, while "discrimination" (departure from
the norm) exists wherever access to the universally needed portion is
so straitened, by a uniform price or other impediment, that some persons are effectively deprived of it.... [A] focus on the predicament of
nonaccess is consistent only with an overriding concern for the1 impair2
ments of welfare or effectiveness flowing from the exclusion.
The past quarter-century of American law and politics have mostly not
been kind to Macpherson's or Michelman's strategies.15 3 Can the United
States overcome the limits of its history, a tradition without feudal or socialist or Catholic strands such as have worked to attenuate liberal capitalism
elsewhere? Whence would come support for even a proposition as mild as
that made by the National Council of Catholic Bishops: that "social institutions be ordered in a way that guarantees all persons the ability to participate actively in the economic, political, and cultural life of the society"
154
while ensuring that the basic material needs of all are met.
Effectuating a guarantee or right of access and participation would be
no mean feat. The property right as a positive right would both require and
be limited to the satisfaction of a culturally determined level of needs, adequate for the development of participatory competence. Beyond that limit,
150. Interestingly, Frank Michelman's classic "Foreword," supra note 25, though it goes
on to focus on the symptomatic deprivations endured by the poor and on the provision of
their just wants and "inner circle" needs like mobility (at 42), opens with a recognition that

"inferior command over resources and influence," i.e., lack of access, is key to inequality (at
7).
151. Id. at 11, 13.
152. Id. at 13.
153. To note the obvious, within three years of Michelman's "Foreword," Richard Nixon
became president, and within four years the Supreme Court in San Antonio Ind. School District
v. Rodriguez rejected Michelman's hopeful reasoning regarding school funding; "Foreword," at
47-56. See Mark Tushnet, "Political Aspects of the Changing Meaning of Equality in Constitutional Law," 74 J. Am. Hist. 884 (1987); see generally id., Red, White, and Blue: A Critical
Analysis of Constitutional Law 147-78, 313-18 (Cambridge, Mass., 1988).
154. Economic Justice for All 15, 36 (Washington, D.C., 1986).
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property could cease to be a "right" and become instead an "interest," disposition of which would be based on political decisions aimed at maximizing
one or another democratically determined social or public interest.
Such interests, both procedural and substantive, emerge from a process
of deliberative democracy grounded in association, association less fettered
15
by property and the dominance currently exercised by its largest owners.
It may well be that the capacity of law to make up for the lack of, or act as
the vehicle for, the accomplishment of, say, economic democracy, is limited, and that without some kind of economic democracy, "real" political
democracy is impossible. But the ameliorative potential of legal reform
makes its pursuit
6 in the domain of property and positive rights worthwhile

nonetheless.11

In this kind of regime, property would be both supplied and limited in
the course of generating a deliberative democratic community of competent
citizens. Citizenship rights themselves could be derived from democratic inquiry into what is necessary to create the social relations needed for a vibrant, free and democratic society. 57 Special rights for property can
conceivably be limited, even as a right to forms of property can be expanded. 58 With property less and less the "guardian" of other rights, and
155. On this complex of issues, see, e.g., Joshua Cohen, "The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy," 6 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 25 (1989); Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, "Secondary
Associations in Democratic Governance," 20 Pol. & Soc. 393-472 (1992); id., "Solidarity,
Democracy and Association," in Wolfgang Streeck, ed., Staat und Verbtinde (Opladen, 1995);
Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy" (MS., 1995); Charles
Beitz, Political Equality (Princeton, N.J., 1989). Put somewhat differently, Pierre Rosanvallon
insists that "the task is to bring into being a civil society of greater density and to develop its
scope for exchange and mutual support, instead of 'externalizing' these needs and abandoning
their satisfaction to the twin poles of market or state." "The Decline of Visibility," in John
Keane, ed., Civil Society and the State 204 (New York, 1988).
Of course, it could be that unfettered democratic discourse is simply impossible because
of the incommensurability of what the participants bring to the deliberative process. See, e.g.,
Steven Winter, "Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law," 78 Cal. L.
Rev. 1441 (1990). Still, Pascal's wager has a lot to offer; Frank Michelman, "Law's Republic,"
97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988).
156. For a persuasive presentation of why economic democracy is both necessary for
political democracy and capable of being facilitated by concrete legal reforms, see William
Simon, "Social-Republican Property," 38 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1335 (1991). In this view, both
Meidnerian social buyouts of capitalism and FDR-like Second Bills of Right are highly desirable but not prerequisite to progress. Somewhat more sanguine than Simon is Sylvia Law,
"Equality: The Power and Limits of the Law," 95 Yale L. J. 1769 (1986). It is, of course, today
difficult to find the optimism that marked Michelman's "Foreword," supra note 25. Even that
essay, however, with its commitment to using equality law to protect the victims of a highly
inegalitarian capitalist society, opens with a nod to politics-the War on Poverty (at 7).
157. Although addressed to the somewhat more progressive Canadian context, this kind
of argument is put forward by Jennifer Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Rights as Relationship," 1
Rev. Const. Stud. 1 (1993) (addressing Canadian "Charter of Right and Freedoms" and advocating the Alternative Social Charter and the nonconstitutionalization of property rights, in
its stead).
158. This is the argument of Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (New York,
1988), and it is persuasive-at least conceptually. Politically, however, it is difficult to maintain such a position without at the same time adhering to some version of a "labor theory of
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more transparently a form of individual and class domination, "the regulation of property would seem to involve only issues of the levels and distribution of total wealth, without implicating fundamental issues of political
59
selfrule."1
Thus, Carol Rose rejects as false, antiquated, or historically specific
both the classic and contemporary versions of property as "rights guardian"
apologia: (1) property enables citizens to be independent and capable of
self-government-in both classical republican and recent personhood versions; (2) property assures an antitotalitarian diffusion of power and resources-from Hayek and Friedman to current Russian reformers; (3)
property makes politics boring and less visceral-from Montesquieu's doux
commerce to Alex Kozinski's passion deflection model; and (4) property
symbolizes all other rights-from Madison to Nollan v. California Coastal
0

Commission.16

For whatever reason(s), there have been no fully successful transitions
to a socially controlled/socialist economy. Instead, the chief vehicle for constructing positive rights of equal access has hitherto been the welfare state.
On the one hand, the welfare state can, and sometimes has, meant no more
than macroeconomic (Keynesian) planning intended to avert the most adverse aspects of capitalist economic cycles. But in both aspiration and realization-especially where and when pressed by mobilized mass
movements-the welfare state has also involved an expanded conception of
citizenship, constructed on the basis of rights, defined positively rather than
161
negatively and separated from property.
Citizenship becomes a social role, a life in the community providing
access for individuals and meaning for collectivities, defined at least partly
in terms of those rights. Those rights are political,guaranteeing the option to
participate in decision making in the political arena; and they are social,
guaranteeing a certain welfare or level of provision of goods and services
62
such as admits citizens to competent community membership.

value"-a point made by Jeremy Paul, "Can Rights Move Left?" 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1622, 1654
(1990) (review essay). Without a concomitant political commitment, such conceptualization
risks becoming mere "rights talk"; see infra at 58, 63-64.
159. Rose, "Property as Wealth," supra note 123, at 245-46.
160. Id. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
161. See, e.g., Gcsta Esping-Andersen, Politics against Markets (Princeton, NJ., 1985),
Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy 7-46, 133-204 (Cambridge, 1985); Tim
Tilton, The PoliticalTheory of Swedish Social Democracy 70-144 (New York, 1991); John Stephens, The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism 89-175 (Urbana, I11., 1986).
162. Of course these political and social rights join exisiting negative liberties (or protec-

tive rights) that safeguard individuals against the state and each other. See also Don Harris,
Justifying State Welfare (New York, 1987); Walzer and others in Amy Gutmann, ed., Democracy and the Welfare State 79-105 (Princeton, NJ., 1988). For how this development subsequently involuted, see Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State (London, 1984).
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In T. H. Marshall's classic conception, 163 born during the struggle
against fascism and with the optimism that accompanied the rejuvenated
growth of Western capitalism, "social rights" would crown the evolution of
liberal society that had begun with the Enlightenment and the French
Revolution. Marshall's schema remains paradigmatic, even when corrected,
as suggested by Nancy Fraser, Linda Gordon, and others, for excessive evolutionism and neglect of gender issues. 16
First came the "civil rights" born of the classic liberal concern to protect individuals against state power-precisely by privileging private property and contract and derogating ascriptive status (at least arguably
exacerbating social and gender inequality). As Marshall put it, the expansion of civil rights created individuals who were "free and equal in status,"
especially when it came to contract and property rights. As the history of
19th-century capitalism makes abundantly clear, "the single uniform status
of citizenship.., provided the foundation of equality on which the structure of inequality [belonging to the modern scene] could be built.''16s Generally speaking, civil rights are regulated through the policing of the state and
are championed or vindicated in the courts.
To a repertoire of expanding civil rights, the new liberalism of the 19th
and 20th centuries, itself a product of complex social, political, and legal
struggles, added "political rights." These offered citizens the formal ability,
163. The classic explication of the nexus of "civil," "political," and "social" rights and
the role of the welfare state is found in T. H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class" (1949)
in Sociology at the Crossroads67-127 (Westport, Conn., 1963). Of course, not every motivation or political strategy involved in creating the welfare state stemmed from this source:
Bismarck is the obvious example of raison d'&rat welfarism. See Sheldon Wolin, "Democracy
and the Welfare State: The Political and Theoretical Connections between Staatsrason and
Wohlfahrtsatsrason,"in The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution 151-79
(Baltimore, 1989).
164. Some scholars, most notably feminists, have challenged the linear "stage theory"
aspects of Marshall's model. They argue that, from the perspective of the experiences of
women (and, to a certain extent, African Americans), the dichotomies and stages do not
hold: citizenship and political rights for (propertied) white men after 1776/1789, for example,
in some ways set back the condition of women and nonwhites by introducing new frameworks
from which the latter were excluded or against which they were negatively defined.
The result is a modification, though not real abandonment, of the legal and political
strategies implicit in Marshall and much of social democracy. See, e.g., Nancy Fraser & Linda
Gordon, "Contract versus Charity, Participation and Provision: A Reconsideration of 'Social
Citizenship'" (MS., 1992); Carole Pateman, "The Patriarchal Welfare State," in Gutmann,
ed., supra note 136, at 231. For a European, needs-oriented view of this problematique, see
Laura Balbo, "Crazy Quilts: Rethinking the Welfare State Debate from a Woman's Point of
View," in Anne Showstack Sasson, ed., Women and the State: The Shifting Boundaries of Public
and Private 305 (London, 1987). Cf. Margaret Sommers, "Rights, Relationality, and Membership: Rethinking the Making and Meaning of Citizenship," 19 Law & Soc. Inquiry 63 (1994).
165. Marshall, supra note 163, at 73.
The expansion of formal legal civil rights under conditions of status equality is what led
certain liberal jurists to argue that the need for reform had come to an end and that tampering
with the social would create neofeudalism. See David Abraham, "Liberty and Property: Lord
Bramwell and the Political Economy of Liberal Jurisprudence," 38 Am. J. Legal Hist. 288,
300-308, 319-21 (1994).
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quasi-independent of class, to participate as full and presumptively autonomous members in the governance of polities-primarily by broad extension
of the suffrage. Regulated through the political process, political rights are
vindicated primarily through legislative activity. The extension of political
rights, especially in countries where that extension owed much to pressures
166
from below, accelerated a discourse of equal worth and equal opportunity.
"Social rights," going back to the extension of public education and
prompted anew by both the evolution of liberal capitalist society and the
challenge of Communism, would necessarily go a step further and impose
affirmative legal-constitutional obligations on the state. The combination
of state managerial requirements and popular agitation would determine the
precise balance within the dialectic of the police power. In any event, "social rights" assume free and equal members of society and attend to "both
the rights citizens formally enjoy and the conditions under which citizens'
rights are actually realized or enacted" 167 in diffferent departments of life. If
won and retained, these social rights would encompass
the whole range from a modicum of economic welfare and security to
the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life 16
of8
a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.
The possibility of constitutionalizing such social rights has recently been
restated by Mark Tushnet:
One can imagine a constitution that protects social and economic
rights [within reasonable limits prescribed by law]. ...[T]he rights are

to be provided to the degree compatible with the society's level of economic development .... [Rlights are qualified by the social setting-

the values of a free and democratic society in one case [civil rights], the
level of economic development in the other [social and economic
rights].169
166. This reading of Marshall is consistent with that of David Held, PoliticalTheory and
the Modem State 192 (Stanford, Cal., 1989).
For a broad and impressive survey of the different paths by which and ways in which
various forms of political democracy have come to be, see Gbran Therborn, "The Rule of
Capital and the Rise of Democracy," 103 New Left Rev. 3 (1977) (popular upheaval, rulingclass politics, external intervention have combined to produce extremely uneven development of different aspects of democracy). See also Anthony Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in
Social Theory 171-73 (Berkeley, Cal., 1982).
167. Held, supra note 166, at 201 (criticizing both Marshall and Giddens for inadequate
attention to nonclass movements and moments).
168. Marshall, supra note 163, at 74.
169. Mark Tushnet, "Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction
Amendments," 25 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 1207, 1212 (1992-93). Tushnet's evocation of "international human rights norms" (at 1213) is not particularly encouraging given not only their
frailty but America's deep historical disinclination to join them.
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Governments consistently protect, enforce, and deal with the impact
and effects on citizens of the civil and political rights required by the Constitution. Their legislatures pass legislation that is meant, as Tushnet puts it,
to "accommodate values inherent in formal rights. '170 To the extent that
many civil rights are largely formal and not amenable to judicial enforcement, they already do not differ from the status that "social rights" would
enjoy. In other words, in both instances legislatures would be obligated to
"accommodate" and aspire to fulfilling formal rights-much in the way
programmatic rights function in Germany. 171 Further, the effects of a specific rights commitment as well as means to effective exercise of a rights
commitment would require legislative homage rather than flaunting or mere
neutrality.172 With "social rights" norms, government's inescapable role in
structuring economic and social relations-including the allocation, distribution, and redistribution of resources through the judicially enforceable
rights of contract and property-could be addressed more consciously, with
a less blind eye cast on a less invisible hand.

How is this role of the complete citizen-competent and relatively
unfettered in community membership and self-governance operating with
social rights and under democratic procedural conditions-to be developed
in a society so unused to, if not actually hostile toward, much of what it
requires? Finding or developing an answer to this question, one that is not
unduly particularistic, is a task that has not been removed from America's
agenda. Since there appears to be no imminent prospect of altering
America's class system through law or politics or international convention,
the principles of citizenship-membership, participation, rights, and duties-may conceivably be mobilized to attenuate the property-based inequalities of that system.
Religion has a place in developing the role of "citizen." As the statement of the National Council of Catholic Bishops intimates, religion is indeed a force endlessly at odds with liberal individualism in American
history, 173 if not ultimately with the actual social structures that liberal indi170. Id. at 1215.
171. See the discussion supra at 32-38.
172. Although the Court has compromised on some "effects" commitments, such as
"disparate impact" in civil rights cases, it has rejected measures that were intended to facilitate free speech where the effects of concentrated ownership were to restrict it; see Miami
Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (rejecting a state "right of reply"). Tushnet, supra
note 169, at 1215, would transcend the contradiction posed in Fiss, supra note 98. As to
"effectuation," providing the means necessary for the effective exercise of a right, San Antonio
Ind. School District v. Rodriguez stands for the rejection of a "effectuation" requirement as a
litmus test.

173. This claim has been made repeatedly in our own history. It has most recently been
propounded in the studies done by Robert Bellah, R. Madsen, W. Sullivan, A. Swidler, & S.
Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley, Cal.,
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vidualism has produced. So, too, Marx's initial objection to religion was not
that religion was the incapacitating opiate of the masses but rather that
religion provided an "inverted world-consciousness" for those who had "not
yet gained" themselves. Hence, it projected nonexploitative and
unalienated conceptions of justice, humanity, and community into another
world rather than into efforts to realize such a world in the here and now.
As seemingly anodyne a mention as the West German Constitution's endorsement of a "democratic and social" state (art. 20 I) can mitigate the
rigors of market logic.
The moral neutralism that inheres in our own negative-liberty society
has, among other things, reenforced the market in privileging winners at the
expense of losers. This is one price we have paid for keeping religion a
private, individual affair. Within our reigning vision, politicians, judges,
and administrators may draw only on neutral public discourse principles
even when trying to establish "social justice in the liberal state." Of course,
not only is "the neutral" often "empty," but when called by at least some of
its real names, such as "secular humanism," the neutral state evinces clear,
coercive, and intolerant tendencies. 174 Particular notions of "the good" or
175
moral ideals are barred.
In this sense, for better or worse, religion also opposes the liberal aspects of existing welfare-state mechanisms. Thus, insofar as welfare states
use the redistribution of money and legal regulation to mitigate capitalism,
religion is no ally of the welfare state. Even the best welfare states have only
"establishe[d] an abstract community in which responsibility for others is
performed by reacting to monetary incentives and by compliance with the
law."'176 Without doubt, this spiritlessness has been a central deficiency of
1985), and id., The Good Society (New York, 1991). Habits, at 28, quotes John Winthrop's
counsel to Massachusetts Puritans: "We must delight in each other, make others' conditions
our own, rejoyce together, mourn together, labor and suffer together, always having before our
eyes our community as members of the same body." Bellah neglects the "chosen people" as-

pect of Winthrop's message, one that could mandate both special obligations internally and
disdain for others.
174. See, e.g., Nomi Stolzenberg, "'He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out': Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education," 106 Harv. L. Rev. 581 (1993). For
the argument that religion and belief are much more dangerous than "secular humanism" or

the empty square, see William Marshall, "The Other Side of Religion," 44 Hastings L. J. 843
(1993).
175. See Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 16 (New Haven, Conn.,
1980). This may be changing some among legal and political theorists: see, e.g., William
Galston, LiberalPurposes: Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the LiberalState 150-287 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1991) (within the larger call to abandon moral neutralism in politics, religion is one
needed source of values). See generally Dan Herzog, Happy Slaves 151-55 (Chicago, 1990);
Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, "Moral Conflict and Political Consensus," 101 Ethics
64 (1990); Will Kymlicka, "Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality," 99 Ethics 883
(1989).
176. Ulrich Preuss, "The Concept of Rights and the Welfare State," in Gunther
Teubner, ed., Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State 151, 162 (New York, 1986) (interalia, law's
procedural norms merely steer and provide no substantive justifications). See also Offe, supra
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welfare states and has rendered them more vulnerable to attack by property
and negative liberty advocates. But these same deficiencies haunt the ideology of property and negative liberty and make it too vulnerable to criticism
from religious perspectives. 177
Within the liberal universe, it is only a small philosophical minority
that is troubled by the fact that "without a transcendent or religious point of
reference, conflicts of values cannot be resolved; there can only be procedures for their temporary accommodation.' 178 The resulting "thinness" of
American citizenship and public life and self-centeredness of private life is a
perfect match or correspondence for the property regime we enjoy. As one
recent analyst has put it, today's client-consumer "demands his rights, sells
his services, contracts his relationships, votes his interests, and cost-analyzes
his life-plan." If Tocqueville saw less of this than our more recent French
observers, it was at least in part because religion then effectively fostered
179
certain "habits of restraint," now gone.
Of course, we now know that the free, white, democratic America that
Tocqueville visited was (at least arguably) none of those things. But it was
(we still seem to think) Protestant, in a way that provided a specific moral
compass. So specific-and intolerant, of course-that by the middle of the
19th century Catholic immigration was already undermining it. In the decades thereafter, ethno-religious-class conflict argued strongly for the extrusion or elision of religion from public life.' 80 It was simply too volatile a
glue. Unlike laicism in France,' 8' however, secularism in the United States
note 162; Michael Ignatieff, The Needs of Strangers (New York, 1986); David Abraham, "Labor's Way: The Successes and Limits of Socialist Politics in Germany," 28 Int'l Lab. & Working Class Hist. 1, 20 (1985).
177. See Otto Kallscheuer, Glaubens Fragen: Ober Karl Marx & Christus & andere Tote
(1991) (examining rise and contribution of religious ideas to recent and contemporary European social, political, and economic debate); Jose Miranda, Marx and the Bible: A Critique of
the Philosophy of Oppression 1-32 (New York, 1988).
178. R. J. Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America 110 (2d
ed. Grand Rapids, Mich., 1986); Michael Perry, Love and Power: The Role of Religion and
Morality in American Politics (New York, 1991) (a more pressing call for the infusion of modernist religious values into public life). For a trenchant analysis of the issues raised by Perry,
see Sanford Levinson, "Religious Language and the Public Square," 105 Harv. L. Rev. 2061
(1992) (review essay), and, relatedly, id., "Some Reflections on Multiculturalism: 'Equal Concern and Respect' and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment" (MS., 1994).
179. The recent analysis and "thinness" metaphor are Barber's, supra note 4, at 72.
Alexis de Tocqueville, 2 Democracy in America 292 (J.P. Mayer ed. Garden City, N.Y., 1969);
see Yehoshua Arieli, Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology (Cambridge, Mass.,
1964).
180. Already by the 1840s the religion-immigration mix was proving disastrous for
American artisans and workers. As David Montgomery has chillingly noted, the choice of
Bibles played a key role in worker-nativist riots in Philadelphia in 1844; "The Shuttle and
Cross: Weavers and Artisans in the Kennsington Riots of 1844," 5 J. Soc. Hist. 411 (1980).
181. On lai-isation and solidarisme in France, especially in the Third Republic after 1870,
see Jack Hayward, "Solidarity: The Social History of an Idea in 19th Century France," 4 Int'l
Rev. Soc. Hist. 261 (1959); id., "The Official Social Philosophy of the French Third Republic," 6 Int'l Rev. Soc. Hist. 19 (1961). Was there an American Durkheim-before or even
among the Progressives?
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removed a key basis for solidarisme without replacing it with something else.
Our master assumption of free individuals in a free market cleared the way
for America's social Darwinism to be linked to enlightenment and fairness.
Wouldn't a nation of "all God's children" be more democratic and egalita18 2
rian than one run by the winners in an evolutionist world?

To be sure, the juridification and bureaucratization of the welfare state
has done much to undermine popular support for it and for redistributive
policies generally. The fiscal, bureaucratic, and motivational crises associated with the welfare state's recent unpopularity are real. 183 As Mark
Tushnet, among others, has noted, the market for an effective and responsible social sector is as large and diverse as ever; it is the conditions for supply
that are parlous. 18 4 But this is not an inevitable or irreversible development,
and a renovated and expanded democratic welfare state remains the primary
vehicle for achieving "equal access" and social citizenship. As the recent
history of employment-related benefits suggests, efforts to return social policy to the sphere of civil society confront an even greater lack of democracy
than that which characterizes the state.
As Amy Bartholomew and others have argued, critics on the left, worried about the "colonization of the lifeworld," and critics on the right, worried about inefficiency and dependency, have alike
tended to conflate a critique of welfare state juridification with actual
social rights themselves with the consequence of treating the latter as
182. See Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America
(New York, 1976). One need not be as sanguine about Populism as Goodwyn to feel certain
that Clarence Darrow and William Jennings Bryan were supposed to be on the same side: the
opposition of Enlightenment and Democracy was arguably unnecessary and had tragic consequences. For that matter, creationism has virtues that evolutionism lacks. As Perry points out,
supra note 178, at 69, Darrow described life as but "an awful joke," and "like a ship on the sea,
tossed by every wave and by every wind; a ship headed for no port and no harbor, with no
rudder, no compass, no pilot; simply floating for a time, then lost in the waves." This facile
existentialism was popular with elite iconoclasts like Darrow (and Oliver Wendell Holmes)
who could afford it and Progressivism at the same time. The absence of transcendent valuesreligious or otherwise-diminishes these figures considerably, I think.
183. Although the agreement of left, center, and right on this point may lead one to
wonder whether the same questions are being asked. From James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis
of the State (supra note 85), and JOrgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston, 1971), through
Michael Lind, The Next American Nation (New York, 1995), and Charles Sabel & Michael
Piore, The Second IndustrialDivide: Possibilitiesfor Prosperity (New York, 1984), there has been
a tendency to (over)value capitalist orthodoxy on key questions. Further, as Tweedy and
Hunt, themselves semi-Foucauldian, have argued, most of the social control, surveillance, and
demoralization stigmata of the welfare state are related to efforts to deny rather than to provide social rights and benefits, John Tweedy & Alan Hunt, "The Future of the Welfare State
and Social Rights: Reflections on Habermas," 21 J. Law & Soc'y 288, 308 (1994).
184. Mark Tushnet, "The Constitution of the Bureaucratic State," 86 W. Va. L. Rev.
1077, 1113-22 (1984) (on fostering the conditions for a responsible and effective social
sector).
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part of the problem to be overcome. Hence, they are inattentive to the
potential differences between types of welfare state juridification, failing to distinguish between welfare state law and policy which is bureaucratic and disempowering (. . . "welfare rights") and actual social rights

which.., are relatively
free of the problems they associate with welfare
85
state juridification.
The freedom guaranteed by social citizenship, the possibility of autonomy, solidarity, and the decommodification of social relations must be made
visible in both state and civil society and seen to underpinrather than undermine the freedom afforded by civil and political rights. 86 Just as it has been
primarily a political crisis that has driven choice within America's economic elites and exacerbated the nation's fiscal and social-solidarity crises
while increasing the privilege enjoyed by property, 8 7 so it must be primarily
a political response that refocuses the debate, in the law as elsewhere.
Assume that a popular political movement is spawned by or out of the
contemporary decline in the standard of living of most Americans. Assume
that such a movement is or becomes committed to the revivification of the
welfare state and the expansion of positive social rights, including even control over work and in the workplace. Can such a political response, one
which, in the tradition of mobilizing state power, seeks to "put government
on our side" rather than, in the tradition of property-based negative liberty,
seeking to "get government off our backs," articulate an adequate legal theory within available "discourses"? How can social rights and private liberties
be reconciled in struggles based on the politics of democratic coercion? Can
185. This "fix it" rather than "ditch it" argument, which rejects the flight back into civil
society, is forcefully presented by a group of Canadian analysts: Amy Bartholomew, "Democratic Citizenship, Social Rights and the 'Reflexive Continuation' of the Welfare State," 42
Stud. Pol. Econ. 141, 143 (1993) (universalism, dialogism and participation all critical to
noncorporatist welfare state); see Gregory Albo, David Langille, & Leo Panitch, eds., A Different Kind of State? Popular Power and DemocraticAdministration (New York, 1993). See also
Joel Handler, "Dependent People, the State, and the Modem/Post-Modem Search for the
Dialogic Community," 35 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 999 (1987).
186. William Simon makes the case that at least one wing of Progressivism, and especially one of its New Deal descendants, engaged in a "social work jurisprudence" that was
acutely aware that rights came with and through the state and that worked to establish the
kind of welfare system that closely resembles what today's "renovators" are calling for. "The
Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights," 44 Md. L. Rev. 1, 17, 30 (1985). Such a
welfare state system would necessarily ameliorate at least some of the conditions that make
impossible citizens using their constitutional rights; see Mark Tushnet, "Dia-Tribe," 78 Mich.
L. Rev. 694, 695-705 (1980).
187. See, e.g., Pierre Rosanvallon, "Beyond the Welfare State," 16 Pol. & Soc. 533
(1988) (arguing that "responsibility principle" and "insurance principle" can only be reconciled through social rights in a welfare state and that their crisis is, above all, political);
Thomas Ferguson & Joel Rogers, Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of
American Politics (New York, 1986); Thomas Ferguson, Golden Rule: An Investment Theory of
Party Competition and the Logic of Money-driven PoliticalSystems (Chicago, 1995) (control of
political process by wealth captures "deliberative democracy"; capitalism and private property
become deliberation); Abraham, supra note 128, at 1268, 1319-37 (documenting how political crisis within economy has transformed area of law).
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American legal doctrine, for example, generate rights that are not absolute,
fully categorical, or independent of other people's? 188
Efforts to develop a social or social-republican conception of property
do not seem promising. As demonstrated, I think, by William Simon's valiant and laudable effort to establish both historical foundations and institutional and legal arenas for social-republican property in the United
States, 189 the prospects are exceedingly slim. To establish equality and participation-citizenship-in the realm of property is a more than daunting
task. Even employee-owned firms, exclusionary and nonexclusionary alike,
are so thoroughly subject to the rigors of the larger capitalist economy that
their behavior in nearly all matters is forced to mimic that of the regnant
system they in principle oppose.
Over the past 80 years, the far better prepared and politically mobilized
continental European efforts to promote economic democracy within capitalist property law have all run aground or been vastly trimmed back.
Backed by strong trade unions and socialist and social democratic parties,
German and Italian models of "economic democracy" rested on three pillars: (1) industrial (i.e., workplace and boardroom) democracy, (2) a substantial cooperative economy present in all vital sectors of the economy,
including finance, and (3) state ownership and control of the "commanding
heights" of the economy. 190 While none of these is prima facie implausible
188. For answers responding in the affirmative, see, e.g., Frank Michelman, "In Pursuit
of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice," 121 U. Pa. L. Rev.
962 (1973); id., "Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy," 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 659;
Thomas Grey, "Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice,"
28 Stan. L. Rev. 877, 885 (1976).
189. William Simon, "Social-Republican Property," 38 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1335 (1991);
see also Paul Brest, "Further beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism,"
97 Yale LJ. 1623 (1988) (advocating participatory equality in economy, workplace, and electoral processes). Simon, at 1336, sees social-republican property as part of "economic democracy," as an alternative to classical, state-ownership-focused socialism, as something of a
hybrid of market socialism and classical republicanism. As Robert Ellickson's oeuvre suggests,
republican ownership, control, and self-management are much more easily accomplished by
those who can claim most of the classical attributes of property ownership, which is in no wise
a matter of economic democracy. Robert Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle
Disputes (Cambridge, Mass., 1991).
190. David Abraham, "Labor's Way: On the Successes and Limits of Socialist Politics in
Interwar and Post-World War 11 Germany," 28 Int'l Lab. & Working Class Hist. 1, 7-21
(1985), and the vast German literature discussed therein. "Economic democracy" evolved,
especially in Germany, from being a stage on the road to socialism to being a substitute for it.
In the interwar years, "economic democracy" emerged as a platform from the center of the
socialist movement. Among the key texts were Fritz Naphtali, Wirtschaftsdemokratie: Ihr Wesen
Weg und Ziel (Dusseldorf, 1925). For Americans, the most familiar political and legal activist
was probably Franz Neumann. An overview of the contemporaneous debate is provided in
Hans Willi Weinzen, WrtschaftsdemokratieHeute? Konzept, Kritik, Konsequenz (Berlin, 1980).
In the post-World War II years, similar proposals emerged from the "left" of the socialist and
labor movements; see Volker Gransow & Michael KrAtke, Viktor Agartz: Gewerkschaften und
Wirtschaftspolitik (Berlin, 1978), and Viktor Agartz, Wirtschaft Lohn Gewerkschaft (Berlin,
1982). In the 1970s, "economic democracy" emerged once again, this time at the culmination
of capitalist economic growth within the activist German welfare state; see Ulrich Borsdorf et

Property and Rights: A "Negative" Citizenship Regime

under American law, in the absence of militant class politics, the prospects
for all three are so thoroughly remote as to render a social-property approach to achieving positive citizenship rights entirely implausible.
Is there then a different legal path to postive liberties, to social rights.
Does the road from negative liberties get to empowerment, or can't we get
there from here? Perhaps the possibility is conditioned by poltical decisions
about privileging certain interests over others. Hence, as reported here,
"[the prevailing view is that our Constitution by and large guarantees only
the liberties, not the abilities or resources; and, further, that it guarantees
relief only against infringements by governments, and not by private
agents."191
In attempting to overcome this view, Michelman, like Edwin Baker,
suggests that a constitutional system cannot simply ignore or disregard property rules that deny some the capacity to enjoy the equal respect to which
the system is constitutionally committed. 192- But under the U.S. Constitution, courts will generally feel that they may, while legislatures are free to
take a variety of stands. Michelman is certainly right to insist that
we cannot broadly say that laws aimed at nothing but modifying property distributions or regulating the economy are inimical to the idea of
a system of proprietary or economic liberty. 193
But in the absence of any programmatic constitutional mandates, even as
mild as the German, this is at best a political question, answers to which
might or might not meet with hostile judicial responses. It may also be true
that "along with property rights come considerations of distribution and relative values of liberties," but alas, current "cultural understandings" and
considerations do not bode well for flexible, communitarian, or social conceptions of property or social responsibility. 194 The outcome of a national
health care debate may, it seems, legitimately be bought.
a!., eds., Gewerkschaftiche Politik: Reform aus Solidaritit (Cologne, 1977); Heinz Vetter ed.,
Vom Sozialistengesetz zur Mithestimmung (Cologne, 1975). Betriebsr&e (works councils) and
Mithestimmung (limited employee co-determination on corporate executive boards) are the
two substantial accomplishments that have emerged from these efforts in Germany.
For a then-hopeful, now-sad American exploration, see Martin Carnoy & Derek Shearer,
Economic Democracy: The Challenge of the 1980s [sic!] (White Plains, N.Y., 1980). The recent
collection by Nelson Lichtenstein & Howell Harris, eds., IndustrialDemocracy in America: The
Ambiguous Promise (New York, 1993), for the most part demonstrates the absence of its subject as a coherent political or economic project.

191. Frank Michelman, "Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional Method," 59 U.Chi.
L. Rev. 91, 96 (1992). Major shifts do occur; see id., "Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property," 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1319 (1987).
192. Michelman, "Liberties. .. supra note 191, at 98, citing and quoting Baker, supra
note 96, at 746.
193. Michelman, "Liberties.. " at 102.
194. Id. at 105; but see at 100-101 and the literature cited there.
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Why, in view of so much bad news, is it at all plausible to assert, as
William Forbath does, that the American Constitution enacts a social vision, a vision that "requires positive social and economic rights"?19 5 If so,
then economic class is not beyond the reach of equal citizenship requirements. Indeed, the historical-legal conjunctures examined in this essay contained, for the winners and the losers alike, features and moments that argue
on behalf of Forbath's optimistic view. That optimistic view urges a broad
and ambitious confrontation with the three leading themes of liberal constitutional thought: minimum welfare rights, opposition to racial and caste
196
systems, and rough equality of opportunity.
Beyond minimum welfare rights, Forbath finds in past struggles movements for social and economic citizenship: decent work, a social minimum,
participation and control, and economic democracy. Beyond the "mere" opposition to racial or other caste-ascriptive measures requiring remedy,
Forbath finds in the past an assortment of pushes toward broad egalitarianism and positive rights, such as have been discussed in this essay. Beyond
any commitment to rough equality of opportunity, Forbath finds constitutional commitments to meaningful distributive equality, to laws that "sustain the citizenry's individual and collective capacities for self-rule"'97 on
the basis of something other than property ownership.
Forbath offers a hopeful people's history: an attractive history of radical
Republicans (in both 1800 and the 1870s), Gilded Age Populist radicals,
Progressive-era enlightened reformers, and New Deal inchoate socialists.
But it is also, I fear, a somewhat implausible great moments history that
cannot answer and shies away from confronting the question: Why do the
winners (mostly) win and the losers (mostly) lose-even though the losers
often have the better arguments and the better songs? 98
195. William Forbath, "Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk?
Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution," 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1771, 1782 (1994)
(reviewing Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass., 1993) and criticizing
Sunstein's excessive court-centeredness and failure to draw affirmative programmatic conclusions from his own astute analysis).
Sunstein's philosophical-Madisonian?-refusal to address social class divisions constitutionally and his ultimate rejection of social rights is most clear in his work on and in central
Europe, where a quasi-Tocquevilleian world of respectable property owners is imagined; see,
e.g., Sunstein, "On Property and Constitutionalism," 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 907 (1993).
196. Forbath, supra note 195, at 1785-86, identifies these three as Sunstein's and the
liberal current's chief concerns. The first emerges from a narrow reading of FDR's 1944 Second Bill of Rights, the second from a reading of the Reconstruction Amendments as
(mis-)interpreted by the majority in City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and
the third from a Sunsteinian reading of San Antonio Ind. School Districtv. Rodriguez.
197. Forbath, supranote 195, at 1803. Much of what Forbath includes under the capacity for self-rule he rightfully cites to the work of Michelman, Brest, supra note 189, and Ken-

neth Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution (New Haven, Conn.,
1989). (It is not clear if those older scholars quite share Forbath's remarkable FDR ardor;
Forbath at 1803).
198. George Orwell is said to have mused that the Loyalists in Spain not only had justice and history on their side but also by far the better songs, at least per Tom Lehrer, But We
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There are reasons that failed constitutional moments fail. And some of
those reasons reside in the ideological sphere, deeper and more obdurate
than the "force and guile of the radicals' foes."' 199 Forbath underscores the
"terror and violence," from which America's property-owning elites have
certainly not shrunk. But this kind of analysis, combined with an acknowledgment of America's great wealth, risks underestimating the consent freely
given by the mass of Americans to the ideology of private property and
negative liberty-in the period of the Great Society and in more recent
years, as well as throughout the conjunctures Forbath highlights. It simultaneously overstates the extent to which "positive dimensions of the equal
rights tradition" are, in fact, "widely acknowledged."200
The Gramscian "unstable equilibria" within which hegemonic interests
operate are nevertheless often powerful because they can include a great
deal without sacrificing the core of dominant interests.20' It is thus not simply a matter of energizing what is "acknowledged" and finding what is "lying
fallow. ' 20 2 The new must be created as much from what does not yet exist as
from what is usable and accessible in our past.
VIII.

FREE SPEECH: A NEGATIVE RIGHTS

COUNTEREXAMPLE
It is something of a standard understanding in American law that unlike positive liberties and social rights, which governments would have to or
do affirmatively promote, negative liberties and civil rights require "only"
that government protect them, mostly by not interfering with their exercise.20 3 The free speech right provides a powerful historical example of both
how this understanding works and how it is obfuscatory.
The social and economic claims raised during Reconstruction, the New
Deal, and the Civil Rights mobilization period stand in stark contrast to
American struggles over what has remained a quintessentially negative liberty-freedom of speech and of the press. From Peter Zenger through a
Had All the Good Songs (Reprise Records). In that instance-a pure war of position in the
Gramscian sense-it seems to have been violence, almost alone, rather than ideology that
proved determinative in both the first and last instances.
199. Forbath, supra note 195, at 1800.
200. Id. at 1804.
201. See Gramsci, supra note 1, at 161, 181, 187. Thus, it was not an accident or mere
"coalition building" that Justice Brandeis, of whom nearly all progressives today are so rightfully fond, was appointed to the Court by the same Woodrow Wilson, southern progressive
internationalist and university president, who appointed Justice McReynolds, racist, antiSemite, reactionary and "bad guy" to progressives today. It is, perhaps, more important that
ruling ideologies be capacious than that they be coherent in a rigorous intellectual sense.
202. Forbath, supra note 195, at 1805.
203. The distinction is formulated and questioned in Tushnet, supra note 169, at
1213-14.
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quiet 19th century, through the disastrous World War I and Palmer-period
prosecutions -and their Cold War progeny,204 through the achievements of
Sullivan, Brandenburg, and the flag-burning cases, freedom of speech and of
the press has developed as a property right. In fact, there has been virtually
no movement toward a positive, nonproperty conception of such rights.
Ironically, it turns out that one of the areas in which our society deems itself
most successful is also one of the areas where the property conception of
rights is most hegemonic.
Notwithstanding notable "protest" cases of the 1960s, 20 American free
speech doctrine has not developed in response to mass protest. Exceptionally, the country has experienced the enlargement of free speech rights as a
secondary outcome of labor organization in the later 1930s and civil rights
struggles in the 1960s. Nor have speech and press rights developed primarily
in periods of successful mass mobilization (like the 1860s, late 1930s-early
1940s, or the extended 1960s); rather, it has been articulated during extended periods of repression and quiescence (1914 through the 1920s, the
early and then late 1950s). This was an area in which the otherwise progressive Warren Court found little useful to build on and built little.
The oft-praised Holmes and Brandeis dissents of 1919-27 appeared in
the course of a brutal and unrelenting period of repression, not a period of
reaction following significant prior advances. As Tushnet has pointed
out, 2° 6 since Holmes the prevailing paradigm of free speech and press has
been that of the marketplace: "free trade in ideas" and "the best test of truth
is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market." In the marketplace, of course, "money talks." No model has replaced this one in the United States, and, in fact, in contrast to other liberal, capitalist, and democratic societies in Europe, the power of free speech
204. See Leonard Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); id., Emergence of a Free Press (New York, 1985).
205. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (endorsement of SNCC and draft resistance
not grounds for exclusion from state legislature); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st
Cir. 1969) ("expressing one's views in broad areas is not foreclosed by knowledge of the [possibly illegal?] consequences"); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (insofar as a symbolic
act, burning the flag a free speech activity). But see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (burning a draft card crosses border between permissible symbolic speech and conduct,
which may be regulated) (opinion by Warren).
An earlier case notably extending free speech and assembly, Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939) (streets and parks in trust for use of public), is better understood in the context of
labor-organizing developments. David Kairys, "Freedom of Speech," in Kairys, supranote 125,
at 140-41, likewise identifies the 1930s and 1960s as periods that witnessed the enlargement of
free speech rights as a secondary outcome of labor organization in the former case and civil rights
struggles in the latter. Only in 1943, at the height of the anti-fascist coalition with the Soviet
Union, did the Court adopt a positive view of dissenting speech itself. West Virginia Bd. of
Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) ("Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the
unanimity of the graveyard").
206. Mark Tushnet, "Corporations and Free Speech," in Kairys, supra note 125, at 258,
citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See Stanley
Ingber, "The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth," 1984 Duke LJ. 1 (1984).
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has increasingly been used to protect those individuals and corporations already strongest in our society.207 "[The First Amendment, usually thought
of as a vehicle by which otherwise powerless people can gain power, becomes another one of the assets held by the powerful."
That free speech as a liberty should move so very little within the ebb
and flow of social class relations is, in considerable measure, a very function
of its negativity. "[Ulninhibited, robust, and wide-open" speech 208 need not
enrich positive liberty or democracy. On the contrary, it ignores ownership
and access-to the print media, TV, and open forums209-among the critical preconditions for positive liberty. By ignoring "background inequalities"
and rendering them irrelevant to the exercise of liberties, a key freedom is
used to buttress unfreedom.
Indeed, the "individual autonomy" in whose name free speech rights
are most often celebrated is a paramount bourgeois rather than a social virtue. The autonomy of "the speaker" may, as Fiss has trenchantly observed,
be destructive of public debate and collective self-determination. 210 In reality, "the protection of autonomy will on the whole produce a public debate
that is dominated by those who are economically powerful." The civil-libertarian version of free speech allows, indeed fosters, just this. The regnant
autonomy-liberty doctrine was galvanized in the years after World War I by,
more than anyone else, Professor Zechariah Chafee, whose sycophantic allegiance to property rights and the propertied classes and simultaneous denigration of the radicals whose freedom he defended has become well
2
known. 11

207. Tushnet, supra note 206, at 259-60, 257, citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (limitations on independent political expenditures struck down as limiting free
speech); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (same, in context of
public referendum); Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 537 (1980)
(regulated public utility may advertise to promote usage even as state encourages
conservation).
By way of contrast, the (West) German constitutional court has evolved a jurisprudence
in the area of electoral law and party competition that is strongly egalitarian. As one specialist
has noted, the Bundesverfassungsgericht "has tended to sustain legislation designed to bring
about greater equality in electoral competition." Kommers, supra note 105, at 837, 849 (citing
Party Tax Deduction Cases, 8 BVerfGE 51 (1958); Party Finance Case, 20 BVerfGE 56
(1966)).
208. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
209. Miami Herald Publishing v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (states may not compel
newspapers to offer a right of reply); Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (antiwar campaign advertising need not be accepted for airing);
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (as private entities, shopping centers may exclude leafletters and speakers).
210. Fiss, supra note 98, at 1410, 1412; id., "Silence on the Street Comer," 26 Suffolk
U.L. Rev. 1 (1992) (examining broadcast and public space manifestations of same problem).
211. See Mark Graber, TransformingFree Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of Civil Libertarianism (Berkeley, Cal., 1991), for a general demystification of the "worthy tradition" myth. See
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The InquiringMind 100-105 (1928); id., The Blessings of Liberty 112-34
(Westport, Conn., 1956).
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This is so partly because the negative liberty principle seeks to minimize government and free up the efficacy of private resources, generally
property. Little has happened in America to impel the development of free
speech fights in the positive liberty direction. The speech liberties of a Robert Mappelthorpe or of a 2 Live Crew are of only arid formal utility to most
Americans. Indeed, whether or not they bespeak the decay of public discourse, Robert Mappelthorpe and 2 Live Crew certainly bespeak the power
of commerce. They are defended not because of any contribution, cultural or
other, they may make to the commonweal but because they may satisfy
some people's private utility. Justice Scalia recently highlighted this private
utility aspect of free speech when he queried the City of Cincinnati's effort
to restrict vending machine distribution of free real estate sales circulars:
Who is to say that such speech is less important than reportage or political
212
speech on world affairs?
Going back at least to John Stuart Mill, there have been deeper and
more sophisticated defenses of free speech than that suggested by the "marketplace of ideas." Because of our own fallibility, Mill thought, we cannot be
sure that even the most patently ridiculous opinions will remain false or
ridiculous. In addition, Mill believed that free speech had a cathartic effect
for the speaker, making him or her less likely to undertake acts hostile to
society while the repression of even foolish or erroneous speech tended to
tempt governments or majorities to repress the next most foolish, wicked, or
erroneous opinion. (Today we call this the "feel good and chilling out" rationale.) Finally, Mill was certain that even the most distasteful challenges
to even the most beneficial prevailing opinions were necessary to prevent
'213
received opinion from becoming "dead dogma.
212. According to the New York Times (10 Nov. 1992, at A19),
Justice Scalia [said], "When I think back to the important decisions in my life, buying a
house was one of the most important." Justice Scalia said that for himself and for other
home buyers getting information about the real estate market was "much more important
than the war in Bosnia."
For the time being, at least, Scalia's argument trumps that of Cass Sunstein, The PartialConstitution (Cambridge, Mass., 1993) (political speech merits a higher level of protection than
merely commercial speech).
213. See Frederick Schauer, "The First Amendment as Ideology," 33 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 853, 865 (1992). Schauer correctly identifies the self-serving hegemony of speech absolutists among legal scholars. In fact, only at the margins of respectability has exception been
taken, see, e.g., W. Kendall, "The 'Open Society' and Its Fallacies," 54 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 972
(1960) (since many people [unlike Mill] value things other than the truth, uninhibited speech
may produce more intolerance); Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance," in R. Wolff, ed., A
Critique of Pure Tolerance 81 (Boston, 1969). But see Ronald Collins & David Skover, "Commerce and Communication," 71 Tex. L. Rev. 697 (1994) (commercial free speech valued
because it promotes capitalism, not the res publica); Steven Winter, "Fast Food and False
Friends in the Shopping Mall of Ideas," 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 965 (1993).
Recently, policies like campus speech codes have received an overwhelmingly (though
not universally: see some feminist and critical race scholar exceptions) chilly reception among
law scholars. Even in Canada, however, not to mention Europe, cross burning and Skokie/
Nazi-type cases turn out differently, and antiracist and anti-incitement speech restrictions
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IX.

CONCLUSION

The negative conception of individual rights was brought into the
world by a market-based view of society where, governed by neutral rules,
left alone by the state, and not discriminated against for suspect reasons,
people would develop their free and autonomous individuality. Nowhere
has this vision been more powerful than in the United States. From Kant
and Faust to Rawls and Madonna, we have known that autonomous individuality is best achieved by those whose material needs have been secured.
Negative freedom cannot secure those needs. Negative liberty, which our
legal regime is primarily about, and which even its radicals cannot seem to
transcend, is good provided you have cash. The undeniable success, power,
and attraction of this conception, elaborated in a nation of substantial and
mostly growing material inequality, has proven a mighty barrier to redistributive (let alone egalitarian) projects in the United States.
It would be mistaken to assume, as so many left legal scholars do, that
legal-social ideologies are so indeterminate that, given opportune circumstances, one can wring out of them whatever one wishes. Institutionalized
and rooted ideologies, like the ideology of negative liberty, enjoy remarkable staying power, surviving and repeatedly rebounding from assault by wars
and mass movements. Our negative liberty ideology even helps set the goals
of struggle directed against it, thereby allowing onto the historical agenda
only such issues as can be addressed within the ideology and without threat
to its core.2 14 It is a persuasive, class-linked but widely (if not ubiquitously)
accepted force of historically constructed materiality. It is how most of us
talk and how nearly all of our politicians understand and explain.
have been upheld. In fact, there are several "inforce" international human rights documents
that require signatories to have the kinds of laws against racist speech that would themselves
be illegal under current American constitutional law.
214. As indicated by the Brennan and Marshall dilemmas, even our bold critics and
critiques are located within the ideology, or as Justice Brandeis once put it, "in order to preserve the liberty and the property of the great majority of the citizens of a State, rights of
property and the liberty of the individual must be remolded, from time to time, to meet the
changing needs of society." Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 376 (1921) (dissenting). Brandeis also spoke out for "industrial liberty" and "full employment," though I think it unclear
what this meant in 1915. See, e.g., Bernard Baruch and the development of war-time corporatism with progressive-fascist overtones.
William Simon argues, persuasively, I think, that through critiques of this sort,.Brandeis
and other Progressive-era jurists, along with their New Deal descendants, were far ahead of
the "radical" lawyers of the 1960s because they, unlike the later legal radicals "sought to
replace, or at least revise the ideal of independence in a way that emphasized the social or
communal dimension of the self and of legal entitlement." Simon, supra note 186, at 13.
For a recent, though admittedly somewhat peculiar example of this shoehorning, see the
pained efforts to fit affirmative action efforts into the rubrics of noninterventionist equal
opportunity: United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Gertrude Ezorsky, Racism and Justice: The Case for Affirmative Action 73-94 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991); Alan
Goldman, "Limits to the Justification of Reverse Discrimination," 3 Soc. Theory & Practice
289 (1975).

63

64

LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY

Of course, all rights, negative as well as positive, are indeterminate and
the object of social contestation: it could not be otherwise. Our rights belong to all of us; they are part of the "discourse." It is thus not hard to laud
their use in popular struggles. 215 In newer words, it is important that the
silences of the hegemonic discourse be opened up. But our negative liberty
ideology is not a neutral resource, equally available to all interests or all
movements. Moses's skepticism about drawing water from a rock was not illfounded.
To transform such an ideology in order to have it serve new objectives
takes a lot of work, work that, for the most part, has enjoyed only severely
limited success in the United States. Hegemonic crises (if any) have been
very few. Similarly, attempts to infuse the ideology with new content confront the ideology's foundations, which have proven remarkably resistant to
undermining or subversion. This arena of struggle, ever since the days of
Madison, has been pre- and reconstituted in ways that consistently advantage property and those who hold significant quantities of it. In this setting,
it is right to be careful about rights altogether. 216 To be too sanguine and
run the risk of illusory victories is as unjustified as being too cynical and
2 17
inviting passivity.
Past struggles do leave their marks nonetheless. As in the instances
discussed in this essay, social struggles and clusters of activism sometimes
introduce ideas or elements that transcend the regnant ideology and turn
"common sense" into "good sense." Only more mass movements-animated
by values originating outside the regnant ideology as well as in elements
within the ideology that can be (re-)directed to undermining the property
basis of our rights-can, for shorter or longer periods, free the democratic
impulse. As always, democracy is a long shot.
215. An extreme version of this position appears in Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis,
Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modem Social
Thought 152-53 (New York, 1986):
Personal rights are simply part of a discourse .... In contemporary capitalism, the discourse of rights thus belongs to no specific class or group and corresponds to no integrated world view... The content of a discourse is simply the constellation of uses to
which it is regularly put.... [Wlords like tools may be borrowed.
See also Radin, supra note 94; Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy (London, 1985). More sophisticated and cautious is Alan Hunt, "Rights and Social
Movements," 17 J. L. & Soc'y 309, 315 (1990).
216. Thus, Eric Hobsbawm has said that wide-ranging rights claims "are not ends in
themselves but broad aspirations which can be realized only through complex and changing
social strategies, on which they throw no specific light." "Labour and Human Rights," in
Workers: Worlds of Labor 310 (New York, 1984).
217. See David Abraham, "Are Rights the Right Thing? Individual Rights, Communitarian Purposes and America's Problems," 25 Conn. L. Rev. 947 (1993) (review essay); Mark
Tushnet, "An Essay on Rights," 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 (1984); Charles Tilly, "Where Do
Rights Come from?" CSSC Working Paper No. 98 (MS., 1990) (stressing macro-political
origins and transformations); Cass Sunstein, "Rights and Their Critics," 70 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 727 (1995); id., After the Rights Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1990).
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That democratic impulse is also a moment, albeit ofttimes a contradictory moment, of the dominant liberal ideology. Refashioning of the elements constituting the hegemonic ideology is part of the creation of a
counterhegemony. The prevailing liberal ideology has past struggles, victories and defeats, inscribed into it. As William Forbath has recently argued in
criticizing progressive liberal self-denial, possibilities for unearthing and
building on past struggles do exist within American constitutional and legal
history, broadly conceived. 218 Reconstruction radicals, Gilded Age populists, certain democratic-technocratic Progressives, and some New Deal
radicals fought the fight for positive liberty and social citizenship. Forbath's
history may in fact be excessively optimistic, 219 but his project is more than
that advocated by "pragmatists." It is, in fact, about working through the
unstable equilibrium within which domination operates in order to approach transformation.
Movement from fairness to justice, from formal to substantive, from
negative to positive, from political to social, may be possible as well as desirable. Or, to put the contemporary challenge more simply, as Langston
Hughes once did in a "poetic interrogation" of and challenge to the hegemonic ideology of negative, property-based liberty: "...
I love Ralph
220
lunch."
for
him
eat
can't
I
Bunche- / But

218. Forbath, supra note 195. See also for the 19th-century development of rights con-

sciousness-albeit mostly individual-out of the antislavery struggle and with a powerful les-

son for the present, Hartog, supra note 58.
219. Gramsci famously called for optimism of the will but pessimism in analysis.
220. "Crowns and Garlands," in The Panther and the Lash 8 (New York, 1967). Of course,
it was a momentous struggle in the United States to get Ralph Bunches, i.e., to overcome
direct, legal race discrimination. In this key sense, Hughes's point is different from, as well as
the same as, Marx's 1845 observation that "the right of the proletarians to eat has never been
curtailed, nevertheless, it happens 'of itself' that they are very often unable to exercise it."
Marx, supra note 131, at 62.
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